State of Utah v. Lisa Deherrera : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
State of Utah v. Lisa Deherrera : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kenneth A Bronston; Assistant Utah Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General;
Counsel for Appellee.
Randall K. Spence; Utah County Public Defenders; Counsel for Appellant.
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) Assistant Attorney General JAN GRAHAM (1231) Attorney
General Heber M. Wells Building 160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 Telephone:
(801) 366-0180 MARIANE O'BRYANT Deputy Utah County Attorney 100 East Center, Suite
2100 Provo, Utah 84606 Attorneys for Appellee
RANDALL K. SPENCER Utah County Public Defenders 40 South 100 West, Suite 200 Provo, Utah
84601 Attorneys for Appellant
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Deherrera, No. 970229 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/809
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LISA DEHERRERA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970229-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF 
METHAMPHETAMINE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2(a)(i) 
(SUPP. 1997), IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE, RAY M. HARDING, PRESIDING. 
RANDALL K. SPENCER 
Utah County Public Defenders 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
MARIANE O'BRYANT 
Deputy Utah County 
Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LISA DEHERRERA, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 970229-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR SEXUAL ABUSE OF 
A CHILD, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404.1 (SUPP. 1996), 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE, TIMOTHY R. HANSON, PRESIDING. 
RANDALL K. SPENCER 
Utah County Public Defenders 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
MARIANE O'BRYANT 
Deputy Utah County 
Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED THAT THE 
CHECKPOINT PLAN FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 
CHECKPOINT STATUTE, IT IS UNNECESSARY TO 
CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGES TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHECKPOINT 
STATUTE 11 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
OFFICERS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ON 
JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION OF THE CHECKPOINT 
PLAN 13 
A. The Trial Court Properly Recognized 
that the Federal Good Faith Exception 
Applied in this Case 14 
B. The Trial Court's Ruling is Supported 
by Illinois v. Krull 17 
C. The Trial Court Properly Concluded that 
Law Enforcement Acted with Good Faith. . 19 
1. The Plan, Though Deficient in Some 
Respects, Substantially Complied 
with Statutory Requirements 20 
i 
III. THE TRIAL COURT IMPLICITLY FOUND THAT 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO ARTICULATE A POLICY-BASED 
REASON TO CONSIDER AN INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS 
UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION AND TO THEREBY 
REJECT THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION 29 
A. The Watts Standard for Interpreting 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution in Light of Fourth 
Amendment 30 
B. Neither Policy Nor Confusion in the Law 
Governing the Good Faith Exception 
Justifies a Departure from Federal 
Standards 34 
1. The Basic Policies Underlying Leon 
are Sound 35 
2. The Rationales Advanced by Courts of 
Other States do Not Justify a 
Departure from the Leon Good Faith 
Exception 40 
a. Breadth of Exclusionary Rule 
and Right of Privacy 44 
b. Probable Cause 45 
c. Cost/Benefit Analysis 46 
d. Judicial Integrity (magistrate 
shopping, judicial dereliction 
of duty, and deterrence of 
official misconduct) 47 
3. Justice O'Connor's Dissent in Krull 
Fails to Provide A Justification for 
Departing from Federal Law 48 
CONCLUSION 50 
ii 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules 
Addendum B - Trial Court's Memorandum Decision 
Addendum C - Trial Court's Denial of Motion for 
Reconsideration 
Addendum D - Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Plan 
Addendum E - Circuit Court's Findings 
Addendum F - Circuit Court's Order Authorizing 
Administrative Traffic Checkpoint 
Addendum G - House debate on Administrative Traffic 
Checkpoint bill 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213 (1983) 39 
Illinois v. Krull. 480 U.S. 340 (1987) passim 
Massachusetts v. Sheppard. 468 U.S. 981 (1984) 27 
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 
444 (1990) 13, 47 
United States v. Corral-Corral. 899 F.2d 927 
(10th Cir 1990) 2, 20 
United States v. Fama. 758 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1985) 29 
United States v. Freitas. 856 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1988) . . 28 
United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) passim 
United States v. Mendonsa. 989 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1993) . . 28 
United States v. Williams. 897 F.2d 1034 (10th Cir. 1990), 
cert, denied. 500 U.S. 937 (1991) 20 
STATE CASES 
Bernie v. State. 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988) 40 
Commonwealth, Department of Environmental 
Resources v. Blosenski Disposal Serv.. 532 A.2d 497 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987), affd. 566 A.2d 845 (Pa. 1989) . . . 18 
Commw. v. Edmunds. 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) . . . 44, 46, 47, 48 
Commw. v. Upton. 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985) 43 
Connelly v. State. 589 A.2d 958 (Md. 1991) 41 
Cravton v. Commonwealth. 846 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1992) . . . 40, 41 
Gary v. State. 422 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992)
 t 43 
Hvde v. State. 769 P.2d 376 (Wyo. 1989)
 t 41 
iv 
Lumpkin v. United States, 586 A.2d 701 (D.C. App. 1991) . . 41 
Mason v. State. 534 A.2d 242 (Del. 1987) 43 
McCarv v. Commonwealth. 321 S.E.2d 637 (Va. 1984) 40 
Mers v. State. 482 N.E.2d 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) . . . 41, 42 
People v. Biaelow. 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985) 43 
People v. Camarella. 818 P.2d 63 (Cal. 1991) 40 
People v. Hieber. 629 N.E.2d 235 (111. Ct. App. 1994) . . . 41 
People v. Leftwich. 869 P.2d 1260 (Colo.), 
cert, dismissed. 512 U.S. 1272 (1994) 40 
Sims v. State Tax Commission. 841 P.2d at 18 44 
State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985) 11 
State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996) 32 
State v. Arbon. 909 P.2d 1270 (Utah App. 1996) 2 
State v. Bolt. 689 P.2d 519 (1984) 40 
State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640 (Utah App.) 
cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993) 42 
State v. Brown. 708 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1986) 40, 42 
State v. Canelo. 653 A.2d 1097 (N.H. 1995) 44, 45 
State v. Carter. 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988) 43, 46 
State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1995) . 16, 27, 39, 49, 50 
State v. Contrel. 886 P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1994), 
cert, denied.. 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995) 33 
State v. Criscola. 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968) . . . 31 
State v. Gutierrez. 863 P.2d 1052 (N.M. 1993) 43 
State v. Guzman. 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992) 44 
v 
State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993) . . . . 14, 19, 20, 39 
State v. Huber. 704 P.2d 1004 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985) 41 
State v. Hvah. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 30 
State v. Jackson. 937 P.2d 545 (Utah App. 1997) 32, 34 
State v. Jasso. 21 Utah 2d 24, 439 P.2d 844 (1968), 
superseded by statute as stated in State v. Lopez. 676 P.2d 
393 (Utah 1984) 31 
State v. Kitchen. 808 P.2d 1127 (Utah App. 1991) . . . . . . 11 
State v. Kleinbera. 421 N.W.2d 450 (Neb. 1988) 41 
State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 32 
State v. Lopes. 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976) 31 
State v. Lopez. 896 P.2d 889 (Haw. 1995) 43 
State v. Marsala. 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990) 45, 46, 48 
State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) 16, 39 
State v. Novembrino. 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987) passim 
State v. Oakes. 598 A.2d 119 (Vt. 1991) 46, 48 
State v. Park. 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App.) 
cert, denied. 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991) 12 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 2 
State v. Poole. 871 P.2d 531 (Utah 1994) 33, 45 
State v. Potter. 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993) 39 
State v. Ramirez. 924 P.2d 366 (Utah App. 1996) 11 
State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991), 
rev'd on other grounds. 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992) 2 
State v. Saiz. 427 N.W.2d 825 (S.D. 1988) 40, 42 
State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) 3 
vi 
State v. Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d 289 (Utah 1995) . . . . 26, 38 
State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991), 
petition for cert, dismissed as improvidently granted, 881 
P.2d 840 (Utah 1994) 11, 32, 47, 50 
State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) . . 30, 32, 35, 45 
State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988) 31 
State v. Wilmoth. 490 N.E.2d 1236 (Ohio 1986) 41 
State v. Wood. 457 So. 2d 1984 (La. Ct. App. 1984) . . . 41, 42 
State v. Zieoleman. 905 P.2d 883 (Utah App. 1995) . . . 38, 44 
Stringer v. State. 491 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1986) 43 
STATE STATUTES 
U. S. Const. 4th Amend 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1997) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-101 (Supp. 1992) . 27 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-102 (Supp. 1992) 27 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-103 (Supp. 1992) . . . 27 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-104 (Supp. 1992) . . . . 6, 20, 26, 27 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-105 (Supp. 1992) 27 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) 1 
Utah Const, art. I § 14 4, 11 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
1997 Utah Laws ch. 284, §1 26 
H.B. 259, 49th Leg., 1992 Utah Laws ch. 72 27 
vii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LISA DEHERRERA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970229-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1997), in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable, Ray M. Harding, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Should this Court consider whether the Administrative 
Traffic Checkpoint Act is constitutional when that determination 
is both unnecessary and inadequate to fully resolve whether 
evidence should have been suppressed? This is an issue of this 
Court's appellate discretion. 
2. Did law enforcement officers act with objective good 
faith in relying on a circuit court's approval of a checkpoint 
plan later found out of compliance with the checkpoint statute? 
A trial court's conclusion that an officer relied in good 
faith on a defective search warrant is subject to de novo review, 
by the appellate court. United States v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 
927, 929 (10th Cir 1990); State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah 
App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992). 
However, since the legal conclusion of official good faith is 
ultimately a determination of "objectively reasonable reliance" 
on a search warrant, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 
(1984), it should not be subjected to a close de novo review. 
See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 (Utah 1994)(a trial 
courtfs determination of a fact sensitive legal issue itself 
"conveys a measure of discretion to the trial judge[s]" so that 
they can "grapple with the multitude of fact patterns" involved). 
3. Has defendant articulated an adequate basis for 
departing from clear and uniform Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
for this Court to conclude that there is no good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution? This is a legal question of constitutional 
interpretation, reviewed for correctness. State v. Arbon, 909 
P.2d 1270, 1271-72 (Utah App. 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions and rules are set 
out in Addendum A. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Lisa DeHerrera, was charged with possession or 
use of methamphetamine, a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony (Count I), unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a 
Class A misdemeanor (Count II), driving on a revoked driver's 
license, a Class C misdemeanor (Count III), driving without 
insurance, a Class B misdemeanor (Count IV), and driving with 
expired registration, a Class C misdemeanor (Count V)(R. 5-7). 
Defendant filed separate motions with supporting memoranda to 
suppress evidence obtained from the search of her person 
("Personal Search Motion," R. 41-49), following an alleged 
illegal roadblock ("Roadblock Motion," R. 51-82). Following an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motions (R. 
103.1-103; see "Memorandum Decision," R. 106.1-110, attached at 
Addendum B). 
In exchange for the dismissal of all other charges, 
defendant pleaded no contest to Count I, preserving for appeal 
those issues raised in her roadblock motion, pursuant to State v. 
Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) (R. 111-14, 117-124, 125-
26).1 After defendant executed and the trial court accepted the 
1
 On appeal, defendant argues that there was no justifiable basis 
for the Terrv frisk, a claim argued separately in the trial court 
("Personal Search Motion," R. 41-49) from her roadblock motion (R. 51-
82). Appellant's Br. at Point IV, pp. 41-45. However, because 
defendant expressly preserved for appeal only those issues raised in 
her roadblock motion, the Terrv frisk issue is not properly before 
this Court on appeal (R. 113, 118-19). See State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 
935, 938 (Utah App. 1988)(holding that the general rule, that pre-plea 
3 
conditional plea agreement, defendant moved the trial court to 
reconsider its ruling on the roadblock motion ("Reconsideration 
Motion"), arguing that the trial court had erroneously applied 
the federal good faith exception and that no good faith exception 
exists under the Utah Constitution (R. 135-152). The trial court 
denied the reconsideration motion (R. 153-54, attached at 
Addendum C). On March 14, 1996, the trial court sentenced 
defendant to the statutory term of zero to five years in the Utah 
State Prison (R. 218-19). Defendant filed a notice of appeal 
directed both to the trial court's denial of the roadblock 
portion of her motion to suppress and the denial of her motion 
for reconsideration (R. 221-32). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In connection with an application and authorization for an 
administrative traffic checkpoint ("Plan," Supplemental Record, 
"SR." 1-39, attached at Addendum D), the Utah County Attorney's 
Office filed a checkpoint policy of the Utah County Sheriff's 
Department, outlining general procedures for conducting the 
checkpoint (See "Roadblocks/Checkpoints," Supplemental Record, 
"SR." 09-15). Specifically, the procedures contemplated that a 
checkpoint plan would be submitted to a magistrate by a command 
claims of error, including constitutional claims, are preserved jj[ the 
plea entered by defendant,, consented to by the prosecutor, and 
accepted by the trial court specifically preserves the claim for 
appeal). 
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level officer (SR. 13-14). The checkpoint would be staffed by at 
least three deputies, at least one of whom would be a sergeant 
who would brief and debrief the other deputies on their 
conducting the checkpoint (SR. 12). Each checkpoint would 
utilize safety equipment, including directive signs, flares, 
cones and lighting equipment (SR. 11). Contact between deputies 
and motorists would be done in a professional manner, in which 
the deputy would advise the motorist of the purpose of the 
checkpoint, request the motorist's driver's license and 
registration, and observe the occupants for signs of intoxication 
or other criminal activity "in plain view" (SR. 10). If all 
documents appeared in order and there was no suspicion of 
criminality, the vehicle would be directed through the checkpoint 
(SR. 10). If a search or arrest were necessary, the driver would 
be directed for investigation out of the flow of traffic (SR. 
10). If traffic backed up more than five minutes or caused a 
safety hazard, it would be directed through the checkpoint with 
only obvious violators being detained, until the delay or safety 
hazard had been minimized (SR. 09). 
On June 12, 1992, Lieutenant Craig W. Turner of the Utah 
County Sheriff's Department, a patrol commander, signed an 
affidavit in support of an administrative traffic checkpoint at 
site #9, SR 144, the Tibbie Fork area (SR. 34). The affidavit 
stated that based on the opinions of Lt. Turner and other 
5 
experienced members of the sheriff's office, Tibbie Fork was a 
problem area, amenable to a traffic checkpoint conducted in 
strict compliance with the checkpoint policy, with particular 
attention to motorist safety (SR. 32-34). 
Original Authorized Plan: On June 15, 1992, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-104 (Supp. 1992)("Checkpoint Statute"), 
the Utah County Attorney's Office submitted the plan for an 
administrative traffic checkpoint on SR 144 in Tibbie Fork Canyon 
(SR. 1-39), effective from June 15 through September 30, 1992 
between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m. (SR. 38-39). Under the plan, all 
traffic was to be stopped, but if delays exceeded five minutes, 
all traffic would be waived through the checkpoint until 
additional assistance arrived (SR. 38). The purposes of the 
checkpoint were as generally set out in the checkpoint policy, 
attached to the plan, but further included inspections for 
insurance cards, seatbelt and child restraint requirements, the 
operation of lights and other required exterior safety devices, 
and other "apparent" criminal activity (R. 38).2 Additional 
instructions required deputies to be familiar and comply with the 
checkpoint policy, directed deputies to deal courteously with 
motorists, detaining them for only one minute unless there was 
2
 "Checkpoint Briefing Instructions," also were incorporated by 
reference into the plan, indicating that an additional purpose of the 
stop was to use, if available, a trained dog to conduct an exterior 
examination for controlled substances (SR. 26). 
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reasonable suspicion of an offense (SR. 26, 38-38). The plan 
also included public notice of the checkpoint at Tibbie Fork, 
beginning May 1, 1992, announced in the Daily Herald, a Utah 
County daily newspaper (SR. 07-08, 37). The plan further named 
ninety-six law enforcement officers authorized to participate in 
a checkpoint (SR. 19-20). Lastly, the plan summarized how the 
period of the stop, the degree of intrusion, any fear and anxiety 
experienced by the motorist, and the degree of the deputy's 
discretion in operating the checkpoint would be minimized and the 
motorist's safety maximized (SR. 36). Fourth Circuit Court Judge 
Lynn Davis, acting as magistrate, made lengthy findings noting 
the conformity of the plan to the statutory requirements, 
attached to the plan (SR. 1-6) and thereby authorized the plan 
("Findings," SR. 40-52, attached at Addendum E). 
First Authorized Plan: On August 31, 1992 the Fourth 
Circuit Court authorized an amendment to the plan, extending it 
from September 1, 1992 to November 30, 1992, between 2:00 p.m. 
and 2:30 a.m., and adding eight officers of the Department of 
Wildlife Resources to the previous roster (SR. 53-57). Over the 
next two and one-half years, an authorized plan was similarly 
extended and cumulatively amended, as shown: 
Date of Period and Conditions 
Authorization of Extensions 
12/2/92 12/1/92 to 2/28/93; 12:30 p.m. to 
(2nd Extension) a.m.; 7 named Utah Highway 
Patrol Officers added (SR. 58-62); 
7 
5/26/93 6/1/93 to 8/31/93; 3 named U.S. Forest 
(3rd Extension) Service Officers added (SR. 63-67); 
7/7/94 8/31/94 to 8/31/95; 5 named Utah 
(4th Extension) Highway Patrol Officers, 1 named U.S. 
Forest Service Officer, and 1 named 
U.S.Park Service Officer, added (SR. 68-
73); 
5/26/95 5/26/95 to 8/31/96; all sworn and 
(5th Extension) certified law enforcement officers of 
enumerated State and Federal agencies 
added (SR. 74-79).3 
Each amended authorization indicated that the court had 
examined the original application for each checkpoint along with 
the requested amendments in considering each amended application, 
and that the requested amendments were incorporated into the 
original authorization issued by the court (SR. 53-54, 58-59, 63, 
68, 74) . 
Stop of Defendant: At about 6:35 p.m., on July 16, 1995, 
Deputy Utah County Sheriff Owen Shiverdecker, stopped the car 
defendant was driving at the judicially approved Tibbie Fork 
checkpoint. Defendant had no valid driver's license and was 
operating an unregistered car. One of passengers was found to 
have an outstanding warrant and was arrested. Because there were 
no other passengers who could legally drive the car, it was 
impounded (R. 48-49, 101-02, 109-10, 249-50). 
3
 The referenced State and Federal agencies were: Utah County 
Sheriff's Office, Utah Highway Patrol, Utah Division of Wildlife 
Resources, U.S. Forest Service, and Utah State Parks and Recreation 
(SR. 78). 
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Deputy Shiverdecker asked defendant to exit the car, at 
which time he noticed that she was very angry and upset (R. 48, 
251). The Tibbie Fork area is remote (R. 251). Realizing that 
defendant and her friends would be waiting unsupervised until a 
ride was available, the deputy asked defendant if she had any 
weapons (R. 48, 251) . Defendant said she did not have a knife, 
which made Deputy Shiverdecker even more concerned for his safety 
and led him to conduct a Terry frisk, leading to the discovery of 
methamphetamine on defendant's person (R. 48, 109, 251-253, 261). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: This court need not reach the issue of the 
constitutionality of the checkpoint statute because the State 
does not challenge the trial court's finding that the plan in 
this case did not comply with the requirements of the statute and 
therefore the checkpoint was unconstitutional. The State, 
instead, relies on the trial court's ultimate conclusion that the 
officers acted in good faith in relying on the previously secured 
judicial authorization. For this reason, it is unnecessary for 
this Court — as it was for the trial court — to determine the 
constitutionality of the statute. The only issue to be resolved 
is whether the trial court properly determined that the officers 
acted in good faith. 
POINT II: The trial court properly applied the good faith 
exception to this case. The officer's good faith reliance on the 
9 
checkpoint plan is evident in this case—the initial plan, based 
on a statute specifically designed to correct constitutional 
deficiencies in roadblocks, provided for each criterion of the 
statute, was approved by a circuit court judge who made lengthy 
findings in support, including approval of those specific 
provisions later found out of compliance with the statute and was 
repeatedly re-approved by various magistrates. 
POINT III: Utah courts have consistently refused to interpret 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution differently than 
the federal constitution, except when federal law is either 
unclear, unsettled, or based on unsound policy. The Leon good 
faith exception, followed by all federal and the majority of 
state jurisdictions, recognizes that while the limited purpose of 
the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, the rule's 
objective is not achieved if evidence is suppressed when officers 
rely in good faith on a judge's prior authorization of their 
objectively reasonable conduct. Defendant's extensive reliance 
on some states' rejection of Leon is counterbalanced by the many 
other states which have adopted the exception as sound policy. 
Because defendant has failed to show a sound basis to reject the 
good faith exception, an exception which serves the public policy 
of admitting inherently trustworthy evidence while promoting the 
constitutionally favored warrants approach, this Court should 
refuse to depart from the federal standard in this case. 
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POINT I 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED THAT THE CHECKPOINT 
PLAN FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE CHECKPOINT STATUTE, IT 
IS UNNECESSARY TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGES TO 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHECKPOINT STATUTE. 
As in the trial court, defendant on appeal claims that the 
checkpoint statute violates both the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Appellant's Br. at 9-17. However, under well-
established law, the Court should decline to reach defendant's 
claims. See State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 144 (Utah App. 1991), 
petition for cert, dismissed as improvidently granted, 881 P.2d 
840 (Utah 1994) (noting that the appellate court should avoid 
addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so);4 
State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) ("It is a 
fundamental rule that [the Supreme Court] should avoid addressing 
constitutional issues unless required to do so."); State v. 
Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 370 (Utah App. 1996)("Utah courts have 
consistently refused to reach the constitutionality of a statute 
4
 In Sims, this Court found it inappropriate to simply accept 
the State's invitation to assume that the roadblock, unauthorized by 
statute, was unconstitutional, and therefore addressed the legality of 
roadblock under the state constitution. Id. at 144, 147-50. Sims, 
however, was substantially different from this case. In Sims, unlike 
this case, the trial court found that the roadblock was constitutional 
under both the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 143. Thus, 
the trial court's ruling denying suppression under the state 
constitution was squarely before this Court on appeal. Id. See also 
State v. Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah App. 1991)(addressing 
defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of a roadblock 
because "the constitutionality question was the precise basis of the 
trial court's ruling"). 
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when there are other independent grounds to resolve the case."); 
State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456, 458 n.l (Utah App.)(per 
curiam)(declining to address whether roadblock violated the 
defendant's state constitutional rights because the roadblock did 
not pass muster under the federal constitution), cert, denied, 
826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
In this case the trial court expressly concluded that the 
checkpoint plan unconstitutionally failed to comply with the 
checkpoint statute under the Fourth Amendment, but that evidence 
should not be suppressed under the good faith exception (R. 107). 
On appeal, the State does challenge the court's ruling on the 
plan's unconstitutional noncompliance with the statute. The 
issue of good faith is independent of the statute's 
constitutionality and determines the outcome of the case. 
Therefore, because this Court must decide the good faith issue in 
order to resolve this case, and because no decision on the 
constitutionality of the statute can resolve the case without a 
decision on the good faith issue, this Court should decline to 
consider the merits of defendant's challenges to the 
constitutionality of the checkpoint statute.5 
5
 If this Court, nonetheless, determines that resolution of this 
issue is necessary to the outcome of this case, the State specifically 
requests the opportunity to supplementally brief the issue. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT OFFICERS ACTED 
IN GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ON JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION OF THE 
CHECKPOINT PLAN. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in concluding 
that, although the plan failed to comply with the checkpoint 
statute, the evidence found during the search should not be 
suppressed under the good faith exception to the federal 
exclusionary rule where officers have relied on a plan approved 
by a magistrate (R. 108-07). Specifically, defendant claims (1) 
that the trial court's reliance on United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897 (1984), is misplaced because Leon good faith applies 
only to warrants presumptively issued on probable cause rather 
than plans approved by magistrates, (2) that the extended good 
faith exception under Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), 
does not apply because Krull concerned good faith based on a 
statute subsequently declared unconstitutional, rather than 
officers' improper implementation of the plan, and (3) that local 
law enforcement officers and prosecutors did not act in good 
faith in drafting and pursuing a plan that so deviated from the 
requirements of the checkpoint statute and the constitutional 
requirements of Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 4 96 U.S. 
444 (1990). Appellant's Br. at 17-27. 
Defendant's claims are without merit. The first claim urges 
an insignificant distinction in the face of the central tenet of 
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the good faith exception, to wit: good faith applies where 
officers objectively and reasonably rely on judicial approval of 
their intended actions. The second claim mistakes the trial 
court's ruling. The third claim is unsupported by a record that 
shows officers reasonably relied on a judge's approval of a plan 
that substantially conformed to the checkpoint statute. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Recognized that the Federal 
Good Faith Exception Applied in this Case. 
The trial court found that although the plan did not comply 
with the checkpoint statute, officers had acted in good faith 
under the Fourth Amendment by relying on the circuit court 
judge's approval of the plan, citing Leon in support. 
Under the Fourth Amendment "[e]vidence obtained by officers 
acting in good faith, objectively and reasonably relying on a 
search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, need 
not be excluded even if the warrant is subsequently invalidated 
by a lack of probable cause." State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 711 
(Utah App.)(citing United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897, 922 
(1984)), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). Defendant 
asserts that because the Leon good faith exception is directed to 
an officer's good faith reliance on a warrant, good faith does 
not apply to a case not involving a warrant, i.e., an instance in 
which a search or seizure is authorized on less than probable 
cause. Appellant's Br. at 18-20. Defendant's view misapprehends 
the essence of the Leon good faith exception. 
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Under Leon, suppression applies only in those cases in which 
exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule. 
Leon, 4 68 U.S. at 918. The rule "cannot be expected, and should 
not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement 
activity." Ici. at 919. "This is particularly true . . . when an 
officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search 
warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope 
. . . . Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, 
rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the 
deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." Id. at 921. 
While Leon expressly limited that decision to the good faith 
execution of judicially authorized searches only, its rationale 
has been more fully developed in Illinois v. Krull. In Krull, 
the Court found that a detective acted in good faith reliance on 
a statute authorizing an administrative search of the records and 
property of car and parts dealers even if the statute was 
subsequently found unconstitutional. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-55. 
There was no question that the administrative search was 
statutorily authorized without reasonable suspicion of criminal 
conduct, probable cause, or exigent circumstances. Id. at 342-
43. Nonetheless, the Court found that 
[t]he approach used in Leon is equally applicable 
to the present case. The application of the 
exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained by an 
officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a 
statute would have as little deterrent effect on the 
officer's actions as would the exclusion of evidence 
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when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance 
on a warrant. 
Id. at 349. The Court emphasized its point, stating: "Indeed, 
the possibility of a deterrent effect may be even less when the 
officer acts pursuant to a statute rather than a warrant." Id. 
at 350 n.7. See also State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452 (Utah 
1995)(affirming court of appeals' view that the officers were 
entitled to rely in good faith on the county ordinance not yet 
declared unconstitutional, and relying on Krull). 
It is apparent from Krull and Chapman that the federal good 
faith exception is not tied only to searches and seizures 
presumptively supported by sufficient probable cause to justify a 
warrant. The hallmark of good faith is reasonable reliance on 
the magistrate's authorization. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 ("MA] 
warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish' 
that a law enforcement officer has *acted in good faith in 
conducting the search.'")(quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798, 823 n.32 (1982)); cf. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 185 
(Utah 1987)(recognizing that "[Leon's] foundation is that 
excluding illegally-seized evidence when a police officer has 
received authorization to conduct a search, has restricted his 
search to the boundaries of his authorization, and has a 
reasonable basis for relying on the authorization would defeat 
the ends of justice," but declining to apply Leon because there 
was "no outside authority on which the officers could reasonably 
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rely [that] expressly authorized the search"). In this case, law 
enforcement received authorization for a checkpoint plan from a 
circuit court judge. In accord with Krull and Chapman, the 
trial court correctly noted that 
this situation is similar to that of obtaining a search 
warrant. There is a presumption, as stated above, that 
when an officer relies upon a warrant that has been 
reviewed and issued by a neutral magistrate he is 
acting in good faith which precludes the evidence from 
being excluded. Similarly, in the instant case, where 
the plan for the roadblock was submitted to and 
approved by a magistrate the officers should be able to 
rely upon such approval in good faith and therefore the 
evidence should not be suppressed because of the good 
faith exception. 
(R. 107). Therefore, the court correctly applied the Leon good 
faith exception, as extended by Krull, and recognized in Chapman. 
B. The Trial Court's Ruling is Supported by Illinois v. 
Krull. 
Defendant somewhat ambiguously argues that because the Utah 
County Sheriff's Office and the Utah County Attorney's Office 
prepared and followed a plan which the trial court found did not 
comply with the checkpoint statute, but was not determined to be 
unconstitutional, good faith reliance by law enforcement is not 
supported by Krull, in which a detective acted in good faith, 
albeit in compliance with a statute that was subsequently found 
unconstitutional. Appellant's Br. at 20-21. 
To the extent this argument focuses on the subsequent 
determination of the constitutionality of a statute, the 
distinction is irrelevant to a determination of good faith, which 
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is ultimately based on the officer's actions and to whom the 
exclusionary rule is directed in a given case. See Commonwealth, 
Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Blosenski Disposal Serv., 532 A.2d 
497, 499 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987)(search of the defendant's transfer 
station by employee of regulatory agency acting in reliance on 
statute upheld without clear determination of statute's 
constitutionality), aff'd, 566 A.2d 845 (Pa. 1989). To the 
extent this argument asserts that the good faith exception does 
not apply when law enforcement does not comply with a plan, Krull 
is still supporting authority. In Krull, the Court noted that 
the good faith exception might not apply if an officer 
erroneously, although in good faith, acted outside the scope of a 
statute. Krull, 480 U.S. at 360 n.17. Use' of the exclusionary 
rule "depends significantly upon the actors who are making the 
relevant decision that the rule is designed to influence." Id. 
If, as in Krull, officers in this case had been acting 
directly on statutory directives, or on guidelines not approved 
by a neutral magistrate, the Court's dictum in Krull might apply, 
thus limiting the application of the good faith exception in this 
case. However, the checkpoint plan was submitted to a neutral 
magistrate. Thus, for purposes of the exclusionary rule, the 
relevant decision maker is not law enforcement, but the 
magistrate, and the exclusionary rule should not apply against 
officers who reasonably rely on the magistrate's authorization. 
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Cf. Krull, 480 U.S. at 360 n.17 (where officers search pursuant 
to statute without judicial oversight, noting that if officers 
act outside the scope of the statute then they, and not 
legislators or magistrates, are the relevant actors and therefore 
proper targets of the exclusionary rule). In sum, Krull, in 
connection with Leon, supports the trial court's application of 
the good faith exception. 
C. The Trial Court Properly Concluded that Law 
Enforcement Acted with Good Faith. 
Defendant argues that the failure of law enforcement, 
including the Utah County Attorney's Office, which drafted the 
checkpoint application, to design a plan that followed the 
checkpoint statute's "simple, unambiguous checklist format" and 
the requirements of Sitz, precludes a finding of good faith. 
Appellant's Br. at 21-27. In making this argument, defendant 
neglects to mention the variety of factors supporting a finding 
of good faith, to wit: the plan's substantial compliance with the 
statute, notwithstanding its noncompliance in certain respects; 
the reasonable limits on what a deputy police officer should know 
of constitutional law; and most significantly, the deputy's 
reliance on the circuit courts' repeated approvals of the plan. 
"There is a presumption that when an officer relies upon a 
warrant, the officer is acting in good faith." Horton, 848 P.2d 
at 711 (citing United States v. Cardall. 773 F.2d 1128, 1133 
(10th Cir. 1985)). Notwithstanding this presumption, the burden 
is ultimately on the State to prove that its agents' reliance on 
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the warrant was objectively reasonable. Corral-Corral, 8 99 F.2d 
at 932. "It is only when the officer's reliance on the warrant 
is "wholly unwarranted1 that good faith is absent." Horton, 848 
P.2d at 711 (citing Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d at 939); accord 
United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 1039 (10th Cir. 1990), 
cert, denied. 500 U.S. 937 (1991). 
In Leon, the Supreme Court identified four circumstances in 
which an officer could not manifest objective good faith. 
Analogizing to Leon, only one of those circumstances is asserted 
by defendant in this case, to wit: "depending on the 
circumstances of the particular case, [the plan is] so facially 
deficient . . . that the executing officers cannot reasonably 
presume it to be valid." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. In this case, 
Deputy Shiverdecker1s reliance on the judicially authorized plan, 
especially since he was specifically named in the original 1992 
plan, was objectively reasonable, notwithstanding the plan's 
partial noncompliance with the checkpoint statute. 
2. The Plan, Though Deficient in Some Respects, 
Substantially Complied with Statutory Requirements. 
Section 77-23-104, on which the plan was drafted, identified 
eight criteria that a command level officer must address in 
submitting a plan for approval to a magistrate, to wit: (i) 
location; (ii) date, time and duration; (iii) sequence of traffic 
stopped; (iv) purpose; (v) names of personnel; (vi) location of 
safety signs; (vii) advance notice; and (viii) instructions to 
officers. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-104 (2) (a) (1995). 
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The initial plan under which Deputy Shiverdecker operated 
addressed each of these categories: (i) the location of 
checkpoint was specifically identified as SR 144 in Tibbie Fork 
Canyon, approximately one mile from the junction with SR 92 in 
American Fork Canyon (SR. 39), and was supported by a description 
of the road and surrounding area, a diagram of the road showing 
directional signs, and a geological survey map of the area (SR. 
28, 30, 39); (ii) the date, time and duration of the checkpoint 
were stated (SR. 38); (iii) the plan indicated that all traffic 
would be stopped, but that traffic would be directed through the 
checkpoint if it was delayed more than five minutes (SR. 38); 
(iv) the purposes of the plan were clearly indicated—to inspect 
license plates, registration certificates, and insurance cards, 
to inspect compliance with seatbelt and child restraints, to 
inquire if drivers had been drinking or were impaired, to visibly 
inspect the operation of required light and other required 
exterior safety devices, and to inspect for other apparent 
criminal activity (SR. 26, 38); (v) a patrol sergeant from the 
list of specifically named Utah County law enforcement personnel 
was designated as the command level deputy and charged with 
maintaining statistical information (SR. 19-20, 38); (vi) a 
diagram and series of photographs depicted the type, arrangement, 
spacing and location of signs on the site (SR. 17, 30, 37); (vii) 
evidence of public notice was given of the checkpoint (SR. 8, 
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37); and (viii) deputies were also supplied with "Checkpoint 
Briefing Instructions," restating the sequence of traffic to be 
checked and the purposes of the checkpoint. The instructions 
also directed those manning the checkpoint to review the Utah 
County Sheriff's Department's policies and procedures regarding 
checkpoints, to act courteously during contact with drivers, and 
to limit the inspection to no more than one minute unless 
reasonable suspicion of an offense developed. Any deviation from 
from the checkpoint policy required supervisory approval (SR. 9-
15, 26, 37). 
In accordance with the statute, the initial plan also 
summarized how the intrusion of a stop would be minimized: (i) 
delays would be limited to five minutes; (ii) further delays 
could be justified only by reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
of criminal activity; (iii) advance public notice and checkpoint 
warning signs would minimize a motorist's fear and anxiety; (iv) 
the discretion any officer could exercise would be minimized by 
adherence to the checkpoint policy and specific instructions 
given on site; and (v) motorists' safety would be maximized 
through configuration and placement of warning signs, barricades 
and traffic cones, and officer safety through reflective vests 
and flashlight cones (R. 36).6 
6
 Additionally, Lieutenant Turner's affidavit further expanded 
on the safety considerations of the plan, stating (1) his long 
experience in conducting administrative traffic checkpoints, (2) 
factors indicating that the Tibbie Fork area was particularly amenable 
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Additionally, a copy of the checkpoint policy was attached 
to the plan (SR, 9-14). The policy further elaborated on the 
implementation of a checkpoint, including the debriefing and 
critiquing of deputies, the gathering of arrest and citation 
data, the completion of incident reports, and the listing of 
additional traffic control and safety measures (SR, 9-12). Most 
especially, the policy fully set out the statutory requirements 
for the checkpoint (SR. 12-14), followed by the measures for 
implementing the policy referenced above (SR. 9-12). 
Fourth Circuit Court Judge Lynn Davis W. Davis reviewed the 
initial 1992 plan and made detailed, extensive findings 
supporting its approval (SR. 40-48). Prefacing its findings, the 
court first noted 
[t]he only issue before the court is whether the 
authorization which is sought is allowed by virtue of 
compliance with House Bill 259. The constitutionality 
of administrative checkpoints under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article 
I, Section 14 of Utah's Constitution is not at issue. 
The application is supported with over 20 pages of 
exhibits, 8 relevant photographs, and a copy of House 
Bill No. 259, the Administrative Checkpoint Act. 
(SR. 48). Thereafter, the court made seven pages of detailed 
findings addressing the manner in which the plan implemented each 
subsection of the statute (SR. 41-47), ultimately concluding that 
to establishing a checkpoint, (3) restraint in conducting the 
checkpoint during icy or snowy conditions, (4) additional traffic 
control measures, including the making of a video, (5) a permanent 
site record generated from debriefing plans, and (6) reliance on the 
Utah County Sheriff's Department Traffic Accident Specialist who had 
examined the site and confirmed that the plan was safe (SR. 32-34). 
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"the plan meets the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(b) as required 
by 77-23-104(3) and the balance of the requirements of the Act 
and that authorization to conduct the checkpoint in accordance 
with the plan may issue" (SR. 40). Based on this conclusion, the 
circuit ourt issued an order (see Order Authorizing 
Administrative Traffic Checkpoint, SR. 49-52, attached at 
Addendum F), whose form and substance again tracked the statutory 
requirements, item by item. 
Although the trial court found that the plan did not comply 
with the statute, Officer Shiverdecker could reasonably have 
believed otherwise, based on Judge Davis's findings, especially 
since Judge Davis approved both the initial plan and the amended 
application authorizing the plan under which defendant was 
stopped, thus giving his amended authorization an expanded 
perspective. Relevant to the trial court's later determination 
of noncompliance, Judge Davis made the following findings: (1) 
the date, time, and duration of the checkpoint was adequately 
described, and that "[t]here is nothing in the Act which would 
appear to preclude the seeking of a multiple-day authority" (SR. 
46-47); (2) "the purpose of the checkpoint and the inspection or 
inquiry to be conducted," especially as supplemented by Exhibit C 
to the plan (see "Checkpoint Briefing Instructions, SR. 25-26), 
"are adequately and reasonably identified in . . . the 
application (SR. 46); and (3) that in spite of the unusually 
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large pool of participating personnel, necessitated by the 
duration of the checkpoint, and in spite of the exactitude in 
naming personnel seemingly required by section 77-23-
104(2)(b)(v), "it certainly does not appear that a pool of names 
as provided herein would be necessarily precluded" (SR. 45-46). 
In further support of compliance, the court noted that the pool 
of named deputies served judicial economy by limiting the number 
of checkpoint applications, and the realities of law enforcement 
which often require the substitution of deputies for a given task 
(SR. 45). The court concluded: "The critical concern of this 
court is that trained, uniformed officers, conduct the checkpoint 
according to the magisterial authorized plan and that a patrol 
sergeant be present who is in charge" (SR. 45). 
Based on Judge Davis's deliberate consideration and explicit 
recognition of compliance, albeit a determination subsequently 
disagreed with by the trial court, Deputy Shiverdecker was 
reasonably entitled to rely on the plan. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 
926 (holding that an officer's reliance on the magistrate's 
determination of probable cause was reasonable where the 
affidavit provided enough evidence "to create disagreement among 
thoughtful and competent judges"). As Judge Davis noted, the 
statute did not specifically limit the duration of the checkpoint 
(SR. 46-47). Further, the statute does not require the trial 
court to determine whether the purposes of the checkpoint lie 
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within the ambit of the statute, but only that they be stated. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-104(2)(a)(iv), -104(2)(b) (Supp. 1992). 
Also, although the last amendment to the application no longer 
specifically named the personnel who would operate the 
checkpoint, Deputy Shiverdecker would not reasonably have been 
concerned with this omission since each subsequent authorization 
explicitly incorporated the initial plan, in which he was 
specifically named (SR. 19).7 In sum, the plan was plainly not 
so facially deficient that Deputy Shiverdecker could have 
presumed it to be invalid, and Deputy Shiverdecker was entitled 
to rely on it. 
"*[A] warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to 
establish' that a law enforcement officer has *acted in good 
faith in conducting the search.'" See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 
(citation omitted). Cf. State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 
294 (Utah 1995)(suggesting that consent to warrantless search 
would have been attenuated from illegal roadblock stop if 
officers had, in the face of roadblock's uncertain legality, 
sought prior judicial approval). Over the next three years, 
judicial authorization for extension of the original plan's 
7
 Although the State acknowledges that at the time defendant was 
stopped the statute required that personnel operating the checkpoint 
be identified by name, the legislature subsequently amended section 
77-23-104(2)(a)(v) to require only the "minimum number of personnel to 
be employed in operating the checkpoint." 1997 Utah Laws ch. 284, § 
1. The amended statute evidently reflects Judge Davisfs earlier 
recognition that the realities of law enforcement made the precise 
naming of personnel impractical. 
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duration and amendment of the personnel operating under the plan 
was sought and received five times (SR. 53-79). Each application 
specifically indicated that the requested amendment was based on 
the existing plan (SR. 57, 62, 67, 73, 79). Each resulting 
authorization stated that the court had examined the original 
application, that the amendment was incorporated into the 
original authorization, and that the amended application and 
authorization was to be placed in a file with the original 
application and authorization (SR. 53-54, 58-59, 63, 68, 74) . 
Thus, officers had repeated approval by multiple circuit court 
judges for reauthorization of the checkpoint, a circumstance that 
could only have made them feel entirely confident that they were 
acting in good faith under the plan.8 
Citing Leon, defendant argues that good faith is especially 
8
 Moreover, to the extent Deputy Shiverdecker might be required 
to assess the constitutionality of the plan after it had been 
judicially authorized, he was entitled to rely on Judge Davis's 
findings, which specifically stated that the "constitutionality of 
administrative checkpoints under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution or Article I, Section 14 of Utah's Constitution is 
not at issue" (SR. 48). See Chapman, 921 P.2d at 451-52) ("The 
enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers 
concerning its constitutionality . . . . " ) . The plan conformed to a 
statute which was drafted in evident response to this Court's 
overturning unauthorized roadblocks and the United States Supreme 
Court's upholding of a statutorily authorized roadblock in Sitz. (See 
House debate on H.B. Bill 259 enacting, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23-101, -
105 (Supp. 1992). H.B. 259, 49th Leg., 1992 Utah Laws ch. 72, attached 
at Addendum G). Defendant cites no authority that an officer could 
not in objective good faith rely on an authorizing court's direct 
pronouncement of the law. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard. 468 U.S. 
981, 989-90 (1984)("[W]e refuse to rule that an officer is required to 
disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by action, 
that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he 
has requested."). 
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inapplicable in this case because the application was drafted by 
the Utah County Attorney's Office, which, along with police 
officers, should have known that the plan did not comply with the 
statute or the requirements of Sitz. Appellant's Br. at 21-22, 
24-25. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n.20 ("The objective standard 
we adopt, moreover, requires officers to have a reasonable 
knowledge of what the law prohibits."). Defendant's argument 
misses the prime focus of the good faith exception. 
"The Court has stressed that the *prime purpose' of the 
exclusionary rule *is to deter future unlawful police conduct and 
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Krull, 480 at 347 (quoting 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). Generally, 
law enforcement is perceived to have acted in good faith when it 
relies on government attorneys to draft or review affidavits in 
support of search warrants. Indeed, this was precisely the 
circumstance in Leon, where the investigating officer's extensive 
application was reviewed by several deputy district attorneys. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 902; see United States v. Mendonsa, 989 F.2d 
366, 369-70 (9th Cir. 1993)(officer who drafted affidavit and 
sought advice from county attorneys concerning its substantive 
completeness before submitting it to the magistrate relied in 
good faith on a warrant later found lacking probable cause); 
United States v. Freitas, 856 F.2d 1425, 1430-32 (9th Cir. 
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1988)(finding critical to its determination that government 
agents acted in good faith in a close case where an assistant 
U.S. Attorney drafted and approved defective warrant provisions); 
United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 837 (2d Cir. 1985)(same). 
In sum, based on the plan's substantive tracking of and 
substantial compliance with the statute, Judge Davis's lengthy 
findings supporting the authorization of the plan (including 
express approval of those provisions of the plan subsequently 
found noncompliant by the trial court), Judge Davis's statement 
that the constitutionality of the statute was not at issue, the 
statute's and the plan's presumptive constitutionality, law 
enforcement's reliance on the Utah County Attorney to draft the 
original application and subsequent amendments, and multiple 
circuit court judges' continued reauthorizations of the plan, law 
enforcement officers objectively and reasonably relied on the 
plan in stopping defendant. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPLICITLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT FAILED 
TO ARTICULATE A POLICY-BASED REASON TO CONSIDER AN 
INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION AND 
TO THEREBY REJECT THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION. 
In apparent belief that the trial court found that the plan 
was also unconstitutional under the state constitution, defendant 
argues that the Utah Supreme Court has not recognized, nor should 
it now recognize, a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
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of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution,9 Appellant's 
Br. at 27. The argument is tantamount to seeking a total 
rejection of the good faith exception, an untenable claim as 
explained below. 
The trial court concluded that law enforcement officers 
acted under the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule only (R. 107, 154). Consistent with the Watts 
line of cases, the trial court implicitly concluded that 
defendant failed to articulate a policy-based reason to depart 
from federal law and, thus, properly refused to construe a good 
faith exception to the state exclusionary rule different from the 
federal good faith exception.10 
A. The Watts Standard for Interpreting Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution in Light of 
Fourth Amendment. 
Traditionally, Utah courts, in applying article I, section 
14 to warrantless automobile searches, have followed United 
States Supreme Court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. 
See, e.g., State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985). As 
explained below, this Court should continue to follow the Leon-
Krull good faith exception because the narrow criteria for 
9
 See State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1991)(noting 
that the court had not yet decided whether there was a good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution). 
10
 Alternatively, the court felt that defendant's briefing of the 
issue was inadequate and refused to reach the issue. 
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departing from federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence articulated 
by this Court in State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), are 
not present in the context of the good faith exception. 
In Watts, the Utah Supreme Court articulated its position on 
the issue of how article I, section 14 should be interpreted in 
light of the Fourth Amendment: 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
reads nearly verbatim with the [F]ourth [A]mendment, 
and thus this Court had never drawn any distinctions 
between the protections afforded by the respective 
constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court has 
always considered the protections afforded to be one 
and the same. 
Watts 750 P.2d at 1221; see also State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 
(Utah 1976) (construing article I, section 14 as providing the 
same scope of protection as the Fourth Amendment); State v. 
Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968)(same); State v. 
Jasso, 21 Utah 2d 24, 439 P.2d 844 (1968)(same), superseded bv 
statute as stated in State v. Lopez, 676 P.2d 393 (Utah 1984). 
Recognizing its disinclination to interpret article I, 
section 14 differently than the federal constitution, the state 
supreme court identified a narrow basis for departing from Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, to wit: to "insulat[e] this state's 
citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given 
the fourth amendment by the federal courts." Watts, 750 P.2d at 
1221 n.8 (citations omitted). Accordingly, Utah courts have 
departed from federal search and seizure law only in limited 
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settings where the United States Supreme Court has inexplicably 
decided cases in a way fundamentally at odds with well-
established law. See, e.g., Thompson, 810 P.2d at 416-19 
(rejecting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), because 
its "standing" analysis was driven by notions of property rights 
instead of the traditional "expectation of privacy" test for 
determining Fourth Amendment standing enunciated in Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511-12 
(1967)); Sims, 808 P.2d at 149 (rejecting Sitz, because the court 
upheld a suspicionless "sobriety checkpoint" based on a interest 
balancing analysis where balancing of interests must first be 
completed by the state legislature, not law enforcement); State 
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 464-70, 473 (Utah 1990)(Chief Justice 
Zimmerman and Justice Durham only concluding automobile warrant 
exception was confused and conflicting under federal law).n In 
contrast to Thompson, Sims, and Larocco, Utah courts have 
consistently refused to interpret article I, section 14 
differently than the fourth amendment in cases where the federal 
standard is clear and well-settled. See, e.g.,; State v. 
Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 548-50 (Utah App. 1997) (recognizing that 
article I, section 14, rather than federal law, was to be applied 
11
 See State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1235, 1239 & 1241 (Utah 
1996) (disagreeing on analytical approach but concurring in result 
that automobile exception is the same under state and federal 
constitutions); Sims, 841 P.2d at 15-16 (Stewart, J., concurring in 
result) (Larocco state constitutional analysis "did not represent the 
views of a majority of this Court" ); . 
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"for the primary purpose of shielding Utah citizens *from the 
vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment by the federal courts'")(quoting Watts, 750 P.2d at 
1221 n.8); State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 111-12 (Utah App. 
1994)(refusing to adopt knowing waiver standard for consensual 
searches under state constitution instead of well- established 
Fourth Amendment voluntariness test for determining validity of 
consent to search), cert, denied., 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
The Watts exception strikes an appropriate balance between 
the need to ensure that citizen rights are adequately protected 
and the desire to have a uniform statement of law to govern 
police conduct. It does not indicate that departure is proper 
simply because some standard other than that adopted by the 
United States Supreme Court might be considered more desirable in 
certain settings.12 Nor does it sanction departures from federal 
law based on mere perceived inconsistencies between various 
supreme court opinions. Only when the federal law on a 
particular issue has become so confused or ill-advised that it 
provides no guidance to law enforcement, thereby imperiling the 
rights of Utah citizens, should article I, section 14 be 
12
 See State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 536 (Utah 1994) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (finding it "'inappropriate for this Court to use Article 
I, Section 14, the Utah unreasonable search and seizure provision, to 
attempt to *fine tune' federal constitutional search and seizure law" 
and opining disagreement with a particular federal search and seizure 
opinion "does not justify resorting to Article I, Section 14 to 
achieve a different result"). 
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interpreted differently than the fourth amendment. 
B. Neither Policy Nor Confusion in the Law Governing 
the Good Faith Exception Justifies a Departure 
from Federal Standards. 
Defendant does not assert that federal law applying the Leon 
good faith exception is confused or inconsistent, but rather that 
this Court should refuse to find a state good faith exception to 
the state exclusionary rule. Defendant founds his argument on 
policy reasons expressed by the dissents in Leon and Krull, and 
other states which resort to their respective state constitutions 
to prohibit a good faith exception to their exclusionary rules. 
However, because there is no confusion in how the federal good 
faith exception may be applied in the circumstances of this case/ 
and because none of defendant's arguments sufficiently undermine; 
the sound policies underlying the federal good faith exception, 
this Court should not depart from federal Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and positively determine that Utah lacks a good 
faith exception to the state exclusionary rule. See Jackson, 937 
P.2d at 548-50 (refusing to find a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in one's garbage, set out for collection on the street, 
under article I, section 14, notwithstanding defendant's 
substantial briefing of state constitutional application, where 
federal law was "clear, sensible, and uniform"). Indeed, this 
Court, as an intermediate court of appeals, is not even the 
proper forum to decide whether Utah lacks a good faith exception 
comparable to the federal exception, see id. at 550 
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(acknowledging that the Utah Supreme Court is the appropriate 
forum in which to fashion a state constitutional rule different 
from the federal rule)(citations omitted), especially when the 
Utah Supreme Court has already hesitated to decide the status of 
a state good faith exception. See Thompson, 810 P.2d at 419. 
1. The Basic Policies Underlying Leon are Sound. 
The Leon good faith exception derives from the limitations 
of the exclusionary rule and the cost of losing inherently good 
evidence. The Leon majority first noted that "[t]he Fourth 
Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of 
evidence obtained in violation of its commands." Leon, 4 68 U.S. 
at 906. "[T]he exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to 
*cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already 
suffered.'" Id. (citations omitted). "The rule thus operates as 
*a judicially created remedy to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights 
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal 
constitutional right of the party aggrieved.'" Id. (quoting 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
"Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed 
in a particular case . . . must be resolved by weighing the costs 
and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case in 
chief of inherently trustworthy evidence . . . " Id. at 906-07. 
The Court then identified the substantial costs of "unbending 
application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of 
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governmental rectitude," to wit: unacceptable impedance of the 
truth-finding functions of the judge and jury, release of guilty 
persons and reductions in sentences as a result of favorable plea 
bargains, offense to basic concepts of criminal justice, and the 
possible generation of disrespect for the law and the 
administration of justice." Id. at 907-08 (citations omitted). 
In support of these adverse consequences, the Court relied on 
research estimating that as a result of the exclusionary rule 
"the cumulative loss due to nonprosecution or nonconviction of 
individuals arrested on felony drugs charges is probably in the 
range of 2.8% to 1.1%." Id. at 907 n.6. 
Having recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 
was to deter illegal conduct, the Court, however, also recognized 
that for various reasons the rule could not have a significant 
deterrent effect in the warrant issuing process, to wit: (1) "the 
exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather 
than to punish judges and magistrates," (2) "there exists no 
evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to 
ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among 
these actors requires the application of the extreme sanction of 
exclusion, and (3) since "judges and magistrates are not adjuncts 
to the law enforcement team," but "rather neutral judicial 
officers [who] have no stake in the outcome of particular 
criminal prosecutions, [t]he threat of exclusion . . . cannot be 
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expected to significantly deter them." Id. at 916-17. Thus, the 
Court reasoned, if the exclusionary rule was to have any 
deterrent effect, it must alter the behavior of individual law 
enforcement officers. Id. at 918. The court rejected as 
speculative that limited application of the exclusionary rule 
would result in "magistrate shopping" or encourage officers to 
more closely scrutinize warrant applications, and that removal or 
closer supervision of magistrates would be a more effective 
remedy for a judge who "rubbered stamped" for the police than 
exclusion. Id. at 918, 918 n.18. Finally, the Court limited any 
erosion of the probable cause standard for warrants by placing 
obvious limits on the good faith exception.13 
The Leon good faith exception has prevailed against its 
detractors for thirteen years. In opposition to that opinion, 
defendant cites the dissenting opinions of Justices Brennan and 
Stevens, first arguing that the exclusionary rule goes beyond 
deterrence of police misconduct and properly reaches the courts 
in their evidence-admitting function. Appellant's Br. at 28. 
3
 Specifically, the Court noted four circumstances in which an 
officer could not manifest objective good faith, to wit: (1) where the 
judge or magistrate was "misled by information in an affidavit that 
the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for 
his reckless disregard of the truth," (2) "where the issuing 
magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role," (3) where the 
affidavit was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its exercise entirely unreasonable," and (4) 
warrant was "so facially deficient . . . that executing officers 
[could] not reasonably presume it to be valid." Leon, 468 U.S. at 
923. 
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However, the majority in Leon recognized that judicial 
participation in a Fourth Amendment violation which might offend 
the integrity of the courts results "is essentially the same as 
the inquiry into whether exclusion would serve a deterrent 
purpose." Leon. 468 U.S. at 921 n.22. More importantly, 
defendant fails to cite any Utah case for the proposition that 
the state exclusionary rule is focused primarily on judicial 
integrity, as opposed to police misconduct. See State v. 
Ziealeman, 905 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah App. 1995) ("'The prime 
purpose' of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, 'is to 
deter future unlawful police conduct'") (quoting United States v. 
Janis. 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) .14 
Relying again on Justice Brennan's dissent, defendant argues 
that consistent exclusion would result in police officers' 
performing with greater care, and that adopting a state good 
faith exception would promote police ignorance, sloth, and 
magistrate shopping.15 Appellant's Br. at 28-29. The argument 
14
 See also Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 297 (Howe, J., 
dissenting)("'The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule 
necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the 
very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some 
right.f")(citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1993)(quoting 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 612 (1975) (Powell, J., 
concurring))). 
15
 But see State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 868 (N.J. 
1987)(Garibaldi, J., dissenting)(noting in accord with Leon, that 
unbending application of the rule may actually undermine the 
motivation of law-enforcement officer to comply with probable cause 
requirements, because xx[i]nstead of disciplining their employees, 
police departments generally have adopted the attitude that the courts 
cannot be satisfied, that the rules are hopelessly complicated and 
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stands as a bare allegation, without any empirical support. 
Relying on both Justices Brennan and Stevens, defendant 
argues that, following the "relaxed" concept of probable cause 
under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the good faith 
exception requires the courts "to entertain the mind-boggling 
concept of objectively reasonable reliance upon an objectively 
unreasonable warrant." Appellant's Br. at 29 (citing Leon, 468 
U.S. at 958-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). However, it is plain 
that courts too numerous to cite have not been overly befuddled 
by the good faith exception, including Utah courts.16 More 
importantly, Justice Brennan's criticism unfairly equates the 
"unreasonableness" in a magistrate's inadequate determination of 
probable cause for a warrant with the "unreasonableness" of a 
police officer's conduct in relying on that warrant: "^Surely 
when this Court divides five to four on issues of probable cause, 
it is not tenable to conclude that the officer was at fault or 
subject to change, and that the suppression of evidence is the courts' 
problem and not the departments.'")(citation omitted). 
16
 See. State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452 (Utah 1995) ("A stop or 
arrest made pursuant to an officer's good faith reliance on an 
ordinance not yet declared unconstitutional is valid, regardless of a 
subsequent judicial determination of its unconstitutionality.")(citing 
Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50); Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 185-86 (finding 
Leon inapplicable to unauthorized, warrantless automobile search); 
State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993) (refusing to apply good 
faith exception under Leon, where detective "misled the magistrate by 
including in the warrant affidavit information that he *knew was false 
or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard for 
the truth'") (citation omitted); Horton, 848 P.2d at 711-13 (finding 
good faith reliance where none of the four circumstances cited in Leon 
for precluding good faith pertained). 
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acted unreasonably in making the arrest.'" Novembrino, 519 A.2d 
at 869 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting)(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)). 
2. The Rationales Advanced by Courts of Other States do 
Not Justify a Departure from the Leon Good Faith 
Exception. 
Notwithstanding the Leon dissents, the highest courts of at 
least eight states,17 the intermediate appellate courts of four 
17
 See State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519, 526-28 (1984)(holding that the 
state exclusionary rule should be applied no more broadly than the 
federal rule, and recognizing Leon's limited application of the 
exclusionary rule); People v. Camarella, 818 P.2d 63, 64, 70 (Cal. 
1991) (clarifying application of Leon, and holding, "[b]y virtue of 
California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (d)," 
which provides that "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any 
criminal proceeding," the application of the Leon good faith exception 
is an issue "purely one of federal constitutional law")(citation 
omitted); People v, Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260 (Colo.), cert, dismissed, 
512 U.S. 1272 (1994)(statute providing that whenever evidence is 
sought to be excluded based on the conduct of the officer, it will be 
open to the proponent to show that it was taken in reasonable good 
faith that it was proper); Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 
1988) (explaining that Florida adopted the Leon good faith exception 
by virtue of a 1982 amendment to the Florida Constitution providing 
that the state search and seizure provision must be construed in 
conformity with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment); Cravton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684, 688-89 
(Ky. 1992) (noting similarity in language between Fourth Amendment and 
parallel state constitutional provision and noting neither mentions 
suppression as a remedy for a search or seizure violation; holding 
application of good faith exception does not violate Section 10 of the 
Kentucky Constitution); State v. Brown, 708 S.W.2d 140, 145 (Mo. 1986) 
(finding good faith exception applied with equal force under Missouri 
Constitution, thus implicitly modifying Missouri's judicially created 
exclusionary rule, which existed independent of the federal rule); 
State v. Saiz, 427 N.W.2d 825, 826, 828 (S.D. 1988) (stating "the 
analysis in Leon and its related case has properly refocused on the 
purpose behind the exclusionary rule"; finding Leon "persuasive" and 
adopting its reasoning under the South Dakota Constitution, art. VI, § 
11); McCarv v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 637, 644 (Va. 1984) (embracing 
"the recently announced *good faith' exception to the exclusionary 
rule"). 
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other states,18 and the District of Columbia19 have embraced the 
Leon good faith exception either by statute or under their state 
constitutions. Additionally, the highest courts of at least four 
other states have applied the Leon good faith exception with 
approval.20 Those courts have collectively recognized that, 
notwithstanding their freedom to prescribe greater protection 
under their state constitutions, the good faith exception 
properly accounts for the cost of inherently trustworthy evidence 
and accommodates the limited deterrent function of the 
exclusionary rule without sacrificing public respect for the 
criminal justice system or the probable cause standard.21 
18
 People v. Hieber, 629 N.E.2d 235, 236-38 (111. Ct. App. 1994) 
(noting that good faith adopted under prior case law and incorporated 
into statute); Mers v. State, 482 N.E.2d 778, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) 
(noting similarity of Article I, section 11 of the Indiana 
Constitution to the Fourth Amendment and the parallel evolution of the 
state and federal exclusionary rules and therefore finding no 
compelling reason for rejecting the Leon good faith exception); State 
v. Huber, 704 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985) (adopting Leon good 
faith exception under state constitutional provision identical to the 
Fourth Amendment, though noting that court was still free to retain 
stricter exclusionary rule); State v. Wood, 457 So. 2d 1984, 210 (La. 
Ct. App. 1984)(adopting good faith exception under state constitution 
for sound policy reasons while recognizing freedom to deviate from 
federal decisions based on constitutional language distinctions and 
independent state constitutional authority). 
19
 Lumpkin v. United States, 586 A.2d 701, 709 (D.C App. 1991). 
20
 Connelly v. State, 589 A.2d 958, 964-67 (Md. 1991); State v. 
Kleinbera, 421 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Neb. 1988) (applying Leon and 
concluding exclusionary rule was inappropriate to apply because it 
"does not serve to deter the errors of judges but rather the errors of 
police officers"); State v. Wilmoth, 490 N.E.2d 1236, 1246-48 (Ohio 
1986); Hvde v. State, 769 P.2d 376, 380 (Wyo. 1989). 
21
 See Crayton, 846 S.W.2d at 688-89 (noting there is a 
"popular but erroneous belief that the Leon Court eviscerated the 
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Against this substantial support, defendant has excerpted 
pithy statements of fourteen jurisdictions which have refused to 
adopt a good faith exception under their state exclusionary 
rules, see Appellant's Br. at 30-39, without any analysis about 
how the preferences of foreign jurisdictions bear on a Utah state 
constitutional analysis. As such, it is deficient. See State v. 
Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 645 (Utah App.)(merely relying upon "that 
exclusionary rule;" determining the suppression of evidence has 
no deterrent effect upon police misconduct and serves no public 
policy when the police have acted in good faith and if deterrence 
is the objective, "it is better served by application of a good 
faith standard for the admission of the evidence seized pursuant 
to a warrant than application of technical rules which encourage 
disrespect for the criminal justice system and disregard of the 
warrant requirement"); Brown, 708 S.W.2d at 145-47 (noting that 
that the exclusionary rule was a judicial remedy not mandated in 
Missouri; approving the Leon analysis that costs of exclusion of 
inherently trustworthy evidence were not balanced by uncertain 
deterrence of police misconduct; noting that statute still 
requires that a warrant not issue except upon a verified 
application or complaint; and finding it "injudicious" not to 
admit evidence, based on the sheriff's conscientious efforts and 
good faith reliance on a facially valid warrant); Saiz, 427 
N.W.2d at 826 (rejecting the broader view of the exclusionary 
rule whose purpose is to restrain government as a whole and which 
sees each branch of government as a part of a single prosecution 
network where no important distinction exists between the 
procuring of evidence by law enforcement and its admission by the 
courts, and adopting Leon as persuasive despite substantial 
critique); Mers, 482 N.E.2d 783, 783 ns.7 and 10 (agreeing with 
Leon that even if the exclusionary rule had an insubstantial 
impact, the small percentage of lost prosecutions masked a large 
number of felons who were released based on illegal searches or 
seizures and that there existed no compelling reason for 
rejecting the good faith exception at least until such time as 
experience showed it to be unworkable or subject to abuse); Wood, 
457 So. 2d at 210 (finding Leon "well grounded in law and 
supported by empirical facts and strong policy considerations, 
[and that it] advances the legitimate interests of the criminal 
justice system without sacrificing the individual rights 
guaranteed by the constitution"). 
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that in some cases, other states have interpreted their 
constitutions to provide broader protections that the United 
States Constitution" does not provide a sufficient reason for an 
independent rule), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
In any case, eight of those cases are immediately 
distinguishable for a variety of reasons, to wit: substantial 
factual differences, unique statutory directives, unusual state 
constitutional biases, or total lack of analysis.22 The 
remaining six express the view that the purpose of the 
22
 Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242, 254-55 (Del. 1987)(finding Leon 
inapplicable to warrantless entry especially where entry could not be 
justified by a subsequently issued search warrant which failed on its 
face to meet statutory requirements to show both cause and 
magistrate's finding for nighttime search); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 
426, 428-29 (Ga. 1992)(rejection of Leon based on statute requiring 
exclusion of evidence obtained without probable cause, with reference 
to state constitutional requirement of probable cause mentioned only 
in passing); State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889, 897-903 (Haw. 1995)(search 
conducted without a warrant, judicial authorization, or valid consent; 
the expectation of privacy declared under the state constitution in 
the case relates to the defendant's residence, as opposed to an 
automobile; the court misreads and broadens Leon to suggest that Leon 
could be applied to a good faith reliance on an invalid consent to 
search); Comm'w. v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 550-54, 554 n.5 (Mass. 
1985)(concluding statute rather than state constitution requires 
suppression; unusual history of common law and statutory exclusion, 
including evidence from (1) search incident to arrest and (2) failure 
to knock and identify; concluding in one sentence footnote that good 
faith cannot follow from the statutory violation); Stringer v. State, 
491 So. 2d 837, (Miss. 1986)(lead opinion approved by only 3 justices 
where five other justices expressly decline to address Leon); State v. 
Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1055-61 (N.M. 1993)(noting allegiance to 
state constitutional probable cause standard which rejects Gates' 
probable cause standard in case where no-knock warrant was issued and 
executed without factual support or statutory authorization in state 
where no-knock authority was clearly abused); People v. Biaelow, 488 
N.E.2d 451, (N.Y. 1985)(rejecting Leon without any analysis); State v. 
Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 554, 561, 564 (N.C. 1988) (rejecting good faith 
taking of a blood sample taken pursuant to "nontestimonial 
identification order," not the equivalent of a warrant requiring 
probable cause). 
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exclusionary rule is broader than mere deterrence of police 
misconduct, but rather protects the constitutional rights to 
privacy and to a warrant based on probable cause, that the Leon 
cost/benefit analysis is empirically unsupportable, and that the 
good faith exception will lead to the erosion of judicial 
integrity and appropriate police conduct. While these claims 
have some intrinsic merit, they are insufficient to justify a 
departure from the federal constitution under the circumstances 
of this case. 
a - Breadth of Exclusionary Rule and Right of Privacy: As a 
predicate to rejecting Leon good faith, states have asserted that 
their respective state constitutional exclusionary rules reach 
more broadly than deterrence of police misconduct.23 However, 
this Court has acknowledged the limited purpose of the federal 
exclusionary rule, see Ziecrleman, 905 P.2d at 887, and with one 
exception, only two justices of the supreme court have agreed 
that the state exclusionary rule reaches any further than its 
federal counterpart.24 Only in Thompson, did four justices agree 
23
 See State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671 (Idaho 1992) (rejecting 
that its exclusionary rule was limited to deterring police misconduct, 
as expressed in Calandra); State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097, 1102-05 
(N.H. 1995)(same); Novembrino, 519 A.2d at 844-49 (rejecting 
Calandra's purpose of exclusionary rule as "constitutional amnesia"); 
Comm'w. v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 897-98(Pa. 1991)(regarding 
exclusionary rule as a "constitutional mandate," and a corollary of 
the Fourth Amendment announced in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383, 398 (1914)). 
24
 Indeed, in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d at 18(Howe, J., 
dissenting, joined by Hall, C.J.), the dissent asserted that the 
prime, if not the sole, purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter 
police misconduct, that the rule was "strong medicine which prevents 
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that the right of privacy was more protected under state 
exclusionary rule. Id. 810 P.2d at 418. However, the privacy 
concerns in this case are much narrower than in Thompson, where 
under federal law a depositor had no expectation of privacy in 
his bank records and had no standing to challenge their seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 417. In this case, defendant 
was stopped in a public place by officers checking for equipment, 
licensing and registrations violations and "apparent" criminal 
activity in "plain view" (SR. 10, 38). She was immediately 
found to be operating her car without a license or registration 
and further detained because another passenger had an outstanding 
warrant and no other passenger could legally drive the car (R. 
109-10). No decision of the supreme court suggests that a state 
exclusionary rule would have been required to protect a 
motoristfs privacy rights in such circumstances.25 
b - Probable Cause: Some states view Leon good faith as an 
erosion of their constitutional probable cause standards, based 
on their historical aversion to general warrants and writs of 
assistance issued with no judicial review.26 Those concerns are 
the enforcement of admittedly valid laws and should be taken no more 
often than is necessary to c^ombat the disease'")(citation omitted). 
25
 Cf. Poole 871 P.2d at 536 (Stewart, J., dissenting)(suggesting 
that unnecessary independent state constitutional analysis resulting 
in "dual" constitutional protections might have the unintended effect 
of diminishing right of privacy). 
26
 State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 67 (Conn. 1990)(assuming that 
exclusionary rule also intended to take seriously the probable cause 
standard); Canelo, 842 A.2d at 1104-05 (tracing probable cause 
standard from historical concerns about issuance of general warrants 
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not present in this case, nor can they be under the state or 
federal constitutions. Further, the Leon reasonable reliance 
test places limits on how far an officer's objective good faith 
assessment of probable cause, or, in this case, compliance with 
an administrative checkpoint plan, may stray before the 
constitutionally determined limits come into play. See Carter, 
370 S.E.2d at 563 (Mitchell, J., dissenting)(evidence 
intentionally seized by unlawful means is not rendered admissible 
by the good faith exception). 
c - Cost/Benefit Analysis: States rejecting the good faith 
exception have uniformly attacked Leon on its lack of empiricism 
in its cost/benefit analysis generally and on its assessment of 
costs through lost prosecutions particularly.27 However, 
statistical studies suggesting that the cost of lost convictions 
is minimal are not especially convincing. Jurisdictions relied 
on by defendant cite other findings from the same studies cited 
and writs of assistance); Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896-97 (same). 
27
 See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 64-66 (quoting T. Davies, "A Hard 
Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the ^Costs' of 
the exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of *Lost' 
Arrests," 1983 Am. B. Found. Research J. 611, 622); Novembrino, 519 
A.2d at 853(citing statistics that in a six-month period for 3 
counties, coupled with a 12-month period for two other counties, only 
one of 44 granted suppression motions involved a search warrant 
defective for lack of probable cause); Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 904 n.15 
(citing statistics stating that motions to suppress were filed in 
fewer than 5% of 7500 cases studied, motions to suppress were 
successful only 0.7% of the time); State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 123 
(Vt. 1991)(citing same study, Nardulli, as Edmunds, and another study 
reporting 1.5% of defendants going free as result of successful motion 
to suppress physical evidence). 
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by Leon, and the dissent in Novembrino, labels the results of the 
independent study cited by the majority as "inconclusive." 
Novembrino, 519 A.2d at 867 n.l (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). 
Interestingly, nonprosecution rates asserted as unsatisfactory to 
support the Leon cost/benefit analysis, supra n.27, are of the 
same order that the Supreme Court in Sitz found significant 
enough to support the roadblock. See, Sitz, 486 U.S. at 455 
(public interest served by 1.6% DUI arrests, and opining that 
much lower rates in the detection at checkpoint of illegal aliens 
would also justify the enforcement measures). See also Sims, 808 
P.2d at 146 (reciting figures from Sitz, in distinguishing 
unconstitutional roadblock). 
Moreover, the costs of exclusion cannot be measured only in 
numbers of lost prosecutions. See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 907 n.l 
(McDermott, J., dissenting)("One of [the social costs of freed 
criminals] has been the breakdown of the deterrent effect of the 
criminal law.")(citation omitted). In this case, the minimal 
intrusion on privacy rights occasioned by the checkpoint is more 
than offset by the opportunity to remove from the road those 
driving cars without licenses or registrations, as well as those 
endangering others by drug and alcohol abuse while driving. 
d - Judicial Integrity (magistrate shopping, judicial 
dereliction of duty, and deterrence of official misconduct): 
Courts rejecting Leon good faith assume that the exception 
can only lead to a lessening of standards by both the courts and 
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law enforcement.28 Cases relied on by defendant show uniformly 
that the assumptions are entirely unsupported by data, in the 
same way that Leon's detractors attack its cost/benefit analysis. 
The majority in Oakes, asserts that the benefits of exclusion are 
"non-events" which are "hard" to measure. Oakes, 598 A.2d at 
126. However, if rejection of Leon good faith ameliorates 
judicial and law enforcement's practice as alleged, then it would 
seem possible, in non-adopting jurisdictions, to measure an 
increase in police training programs or a percentage decrease in 
overturned suppression motions based on lack of probable cause. 
In fact, it is suggested, that "indiscriminate application of the 
exclusionary rule may actually hinder the educative and deterrent 
requirement of probable cause." Novembrino, 519 A.2d at 868 
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting)(since the good faith exception 
operates only when the officer acts reasonably, it provides in 
those instances an incentive to police departments to formulate 
for officers appropriate search and seizure rules). 
3. Justice O'Connor'a Dissent in Km 11 Fails to Provide 
A Justification for Departing from Federal Law. 
Defendant cites Justice O'Connor's dissent in Krull, as a 
secondary basis for rejecting the good faith exception under 
28
 Marsala, 579 A.2d at 67-68 (concluding that rejecting the good 
faith exception will result in less judge shopping, more careful 
judicial scrutiny of warrant applications, and encouragement to police 
to work to establish probable cause); Oakes. 598 A.2d at 124-25 
(same); Edmunds. 586 A.2d at 900-01 (exlusionary rule preserves 
judicial integrity and the warrant issuing process). 
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article I, section 14. Appellant's Br. at 3 8-41. The thrust of 
this dissent is that unlike a defective warrant an 
unconstitutional statute reaches more broadly, is the creation of 
a legislature biased toward law enforcement, and provides a grace 
period for unconstitutional conduct. Krull. 480 U.S. at 361-69 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Defendant, however, fails to show 
why this Court should adopt a dissenting view, unsupported by any 
other authority, as a basis for departing from now well-
established federal law. Indeed, in Chapman, the supreme court 
applied Krull. finding that an officer acted in good faith in 
relying on a county loitering ordinance, not then declared 
unconstitutional. Chapman, 921 P.2d at 451-52. Thus, there is 
no indication that Utah's appellate courts view the Krull 
extension of Leon good faith as so confusing or inconsistent that 
there should be a departure from federal law.29 
Even a brief consideration of Justice O'Connor's dissenting 
remarks show that they are not particularly relevant to this case. 
First, the Krull good faith exception is secondary in this case 
where law enforcement's good faith is premised primarily on its 
conforming a plan to a statute followed by its reliance on the 
circuit court's authorization of that plan, rather than law 
enforcement's perception of the statute's constitutionality. 
Second, Justice O'Connor's criticism, that the majority in Krull 
created an unworkable rule because it could not specify how much 
constitutional law an officer must know, see Krull. 480 U.S. at 
366-67 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), is not persuasive in this 
case. See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452 (recognizing a 
standard in which a law officer must recognize a "*law so grossly 
and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable 
prudence would be bound to see its flaws,'" and implicitly 
finding that officer made that determination)(quoting Michigan v. 
DeFillippo. 443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979)). Moreover, Deputy 
Shiverdecker, and command level officers in the Utah County 
Sheriff's Office particularly, would reasonably have known that 
the checkpoint statute was enacted to fill an unconstitutional 
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There is no showing in this case that if the good faith 
exception were jettisoned, there would be any better performances 
by the judiciary or law enforcement, both of which, as argued 
above, were reasonable. In sum, under the facts of this case, to 
wit: reliance on a plan approved by numerous circuit court 
judges, this Court should find that there are no sufficient 
policy reasons for departing from the federal good faith 
exception under the state constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully 
requests that defendant's conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /? day of November, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General Attorney General 
'KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
void in the area of roadblocks, and that by creating statutory 
authorization for a checkpoint the legislature had overcome the 
principal hurdle in establishing the checkpoint's 
constitutionality. See Sims, 808 P.2d at 149. Third, the Utah 
Supreme Court has implicitly rejected Justice O'Connor's concern 
about the inappropriate creation of a legislative "grace period," 
for unconstitutional legislation when the good faith exception is 
applied to a statute. Krull, 480 U.S. at 361, 366 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). See Chapman, 921 P.2d at 451 n.9 (applying good 
faith while expressly declining lead author's invitation to reach 
the constitutionality of the ordinance). Lastly, Justice 
O'Connor's claim, that good faith reliance on an unreasonable 
statute is more socially costly than such reliance on a single 
defective warrant, fails to recognize that the Leon exception, in 
which she concurred, reaches a very great number of single 
instances nationwide. In sum, none of these arguments 
sufficiently support a departure from clearly stated federal law. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Randall K. Spencer, Utah County Public Defenders, attorneys for 
defendant, 40 South 100 West, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601, this 
ry day of November, 1997. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
Art. I, § 14 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or tiling 
to be seized. 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC CHECKPOINTS 
77.23-101. Title of act. 
Sections 77-23-101 through 77-23-105 may be cited as the "Administrative 
Traffic Checkpoint Act." 
77-23-102. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) * Administrative traffic checkpoint" means a roadblock procedure 
where enforcement officers stop all, or a designated sequence of, motor 
vehicles traveling on highways and roads and subject those vehicles to 
inspection or testing and the drivers or occupants to questioning or the 
production of documents. 
(2) "Command level officer" includes all sheriffs, heads of law enforce-
ment agencies, and all supervisory enforcement officers of sergeant rank 
or higher. 
(3) "Emergency circumstances" means circumstances where enforce-
ment officers reasonably believe road conditions, weather conditions, or 
persons present a significant hazard to persons or the property of other 
persons. 
(4) "Enforcement officer" includes: 
(a) peace officers as defined in Title 77, Chapter la; 
(b) correctional officers as defined in Title 77, Chapter la; 
(c) special function officers as defined and under the restrictions of 
Title 77, Chapter la; and 
(d) federal peace officers as defined in Title 77, Chapter la. 
(5) "Magistrate* includes all judicial officers enumerated in Subsection 
77-1-3(4). 
(6) "Motor vehicle" includes all vehicles as defined in Title 41, Chapter 
la. 
77-23-103. Circumstances permit t ing a n administrative 
traffic checkpoint . 
A motor vehicle may be stopped and the occupants detained by an enforce-
ment officer when the enforcement officer: 
(1) is acting pursuant to a duly authorized search warrant or arrest 
warrant; 
(2) has probable cause to arrest or search; 
(3) has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is 
occurring; 
(4) is acting under emergency circumstances; or 
77-23-104. Magistrate authority required. 
(1) An administrative traffic checkpoint may be established and operated 
upon written authority of a magistrate. 
(2) A magistrate may issue written authority to establish and operate an 
administrative traffic checkpoint if: 
(a) a command level officer submits to the magistrate a written plan 
signed by the command level officer describing: 
(i) the location of the checkpoint including geographical and topo-
graphical information; 
(ii) the date, time, and duration of the checkpoint; 
(iii) the sequence of traffic to be stopped; 
(iv) the purpose of the checkpoint including the inspection or 
inquiry to be conducted; 
(v) the names of the personnel to be employed in operating the 
checkpoint including the name of the officer or officers in charge at the 
scene; 
(vi) the configuration and location of signs, barriers, and other 
means of informing approaching motorists that they must stop and 
directing them to the place to stop; 
(vii) any advance notice to the public at large of the establishment 
of the checkpoint; and 
(viii) the instructions to be given to the enforcement officers oper-
ating the checkpoint; and 
(b) the magistrate makes an independent judicial determination that 
the plan appropriately: 
(i) minimizes the length of time the motorist will be delayed; 
(ii) minimizes the intrusion of the inspection or inquiry; 
(iii) minimizes the fear and anxiety the motorist will experience; 
(iv) minimizes the degree of discretion to be exercised by the 
individual enforcement officers operating the checkpoint; and 
(v) maximizes the safety of the motorist and the enforcement 
officers. 
(3) Upon determination by the magistrate that the plan meets the require-
ments of Subsection (2Kb), the magistrate shall sign the authorization and 
issue it to the command level officer, retaining a copy for the court's file. 
(4) A copy of the plan and signed authorization shall be issued to the 
checkpoint command level officer participating in the operation of the check-
point 
(5) Any enforcement officer participating in the operation of the checkpoint 
shall conform his activities as nearly as practicable to the procedures outlined 
in the plan. 
(6) The checkpoint command level officer shall be available to exhibit a copy 
of the plan and signed authorization to any motorist who has been stopped at 
the checkpoint upon request of the motorist 
77-23-105. Failure to stop — Criminal liability. 
xneanor. 
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hurtj\Mmit»mn« Court 
•'JSJ-SfW ••«••» Utah 
^ , w«puty 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
LISA DEHERRERA, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 961400364 
DATE: July 5T1996 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. Having received and considered the Motion, and having heard and considered the 
evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby denies the Defendant's Motion. 
Factual Background 
On September 16, 1995 the Defendant approached an administrative checkpoint near 
the Tibbie Fork Junction in American Fork Canyon. The Utah Counly Sheriffs Office had 
set up a roadblock which had been judicially approved. The Defendant was driving as she 
and her passengers neared the roadblock. Upon reaching the roadblock the Defendant was 
questioned by an officer who discovered that the Defendant was driving an unregistered 
vehicle and that she did not have a valid driver's license. 
Furthermore, it was discovered that there was an outstanding warrant for one of the 
passengers who was placed under arrest. After speaking with the other passengers, and 
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finding that there was no one who could legally drive the vehicle, the officers were forced to 
impound the vehicle. 
Deputy Shiverdecker asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle at which time he noticed 
her agitated character. Realizing that she, with the other passengers, would be waiting at the 
roadblock unattended until their ride came, Deputy Shiverdecker asked if the Defendant had 
any weapons. The Defendant stated that she "did not have a knife.M The Deputy, suspicious 
of her answer, attempted to neutralize the situation to assure the safety of those at the 
roadblock by conducting a Terry search of the Defendant. 
The Deputy conducted the Terry frisk by first patting down the Defendant's left pants 
pocket which he felt contained change and other insignificant items. While patting down the 
right pants pocket of the Defendant, Deputy Shiverdecker found it extremely full and bulging 
such that he was unable to discern what the pocket contained. To facilitate the search the 
Deputy asked the Defendant to empty her pocket which she did, however not completely. 
The Deputy noted that there was still a bulge in her pocket and asked the Defendant what it 
was. The Defendant then proceeded voluntarily to extract a small container which through its 
transparent walls it appeared to contain methamphetamine. 
Opinion of the Court 
L Fourth Amendment Principles 
A. Regarding the Roadblock 
A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a roadblock. 
Michigan State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990). However, this MseizureM is 
reasonable in light of the Fourth Amendment upon applying a balancing analysis. Sitz, 496 
U.S. at 455. This balancing analysis includes 3 criterion; 1) the state's interest in preventing 
accidents caused by drunk drivers, 2) the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving 
that goal, and 3) the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints. 
Id. at 449. When these criterion are met the roadblocks are allowed in order to check for 
drunk drivers. 
The applicable procedure for these "administrative traffic checkpoints" is set forth in 
sections 77-23-101 through 77-23-105 of the Utah Code. The purpose of the roadblock, its 
date, time and duration, the names of the personnel working the checkpoint, and the 
instructions to be given to the officers at the checkpoint all need to be provided in the plan 
I 
which must be signed by a magistrate in order to effectuate the checkpoint. Utah Code § 77-
23-104 (1992). It is the responsibility of the Magistrate to ensure that the plan as proposed 
and presented by the law enforcement officers does not violate any of the above 3 criterion in 
Sitz and the limits set forth by the statute. 
The officers who obtain the plan from the Magistrate invoke what the Supreme Court 
termed a "good faith" rule which precludes the exclusion of evidence seized by an officer 
when acting in good faith upon a warrant U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
B. Regarding the Search of the Defendant's Person 
Warrantless searches are constitutionally permissible only where probable cause and 
exigent circumstances exist. State v. Larocco, 19A P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). Such exigent 
circumstances exist when a police officer feels that he or someone else may be in danger. 
>•> A A 
This is measured by the "reasonably prudent man under the circumstances" standard. State v. 
Ay da, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App. 1988), quoting State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 
1986). 
DL Analysis 
A. Regarding the Roadblock 
Applying these Fourth Amendment principles to the present case, the Court finds that 
with regards to the roadblock, the plan for the administrative checkpoint did not comply with 
the terms of the statute because it was overly broad making it invalid and unconstitutional. 
However, this situation is similar to that of obtaining a search warrant. There is a 
presumption, as stated above, that when an officer relies upon a warrant that has been 
reviewed and issued by a neutral judge he is acting in good faith which precludes the 
evidence from being excluded. Similarly, in the instant case, where the plan for the 
roadblock was submitted to and approved by a magistrate the officers should be able to rely 
upon such approval in good faith and therefore the evidence should not be suppressed because 
of the good faith exception. 
The statute describes various specifics with which the administrative checkpoint must 
comply before it is to be approved by the judiciary. The time, date, duration, the names of 
the personnel to be employed at the checkpoint, and the instructions and purpose of the 
checkpoint must be included. 
Although in the instant case the time, date and duration are included in the plan the 
Court finds that an ongoing checkpoint which may be set up at any time over a period of a 
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year is entirely too long and does not meet the intent of the statute. 
Also, the names of the personnel are required to be on the plan, in this case merely the 
office from which they were to come was placed on the plan. Thus, the specificity that the 
statute requires was not included in the plan. 
Lastly, the purpose as well as the instructions which the officers have at the roadblock 
went beyond the scope of the statute. The roadblocks are ideally set up to check for drunk 
drivers. By broadening the search the officers violate the third criterion of the Sitz test and 
the search conducted at the roadblock becomes too intrusive upon an individual's rights. 
B. Regarding the Search of Defendant's Peison 
Applying the above Fourth Amendment principles the Court finds that there were 
sufficient exigent circumstances to authorize Deputy Shiverdecker's search of the Defendant's 
person. 
The Deputy was justified in performing the search of the Defendant because of the 
circumstances that required the Deputy to leave the Defendant unattended at the checkpoint as 
well as the agitated character of the Defendant, the suspicious answer regarding a "knife," and 
the bulging pocket 
The Deputy conducted the Terry search in an effort to reduce the possibility of harm 
to himself or to his fellow officers. The following request to have the Defendant empty the 
contents of her pocket was reasonable because the Deputy was unable to identify the objects 
by merely feeling through the pockets. Furthermore, questioning her about what still 
remained in her pocket was still within the bounds of the search and her voluntary production 
of the item in no way provides reason which would allow the Court to suppress the evidence. 
The search of Defendant's person was allowed because of the exigent circumstances 
and the evidence will not be suppressed. 
Order 
Counsel for the Plaintiff is to prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an 
order within IS days of this decision consistent with and in support of the terms of this 
memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission 
to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect until such order is 
signed by the Court. 
Dated thisJ^day of July, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Mariane OTJryant, Esq. 
Michael E. Jewell, Esq. 
ADDENDUM C 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah Cg^nty./ltate of Utah 
Dent.it 
CfRftRlTSMn 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
LISA DEHERRERA, 
Plaintiffs, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 961400364 
DATE: September 11, 1996 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: Christine Gerhart 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
Having received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda both in support of and 
in opposition to the Motion, the Court delivers the following Memorandum Decision. 
I 
Opinion of the Court 
The Court finds that the Defendant's arguments in support of her Motion to Reconsider 
are fact sensitive issues that have been sufficiently addressed in the Court's prior ruling. In 
addition, the Defendant argues that the Court should reconsider based on the State's failure to 
proffer evidence in support of the Good Faith Exception. The Court finds that there is no 
requirement for the State to prove good faith when the officers were acting pursuant to what 
they believed was a valid warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. 
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Order 
The Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration is denied. 
Dated this 11th day of September, 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Public Defender, Esq. 
County Attorney, Esq. 
ING, juneEy 
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ADDENDUM D 
KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
CRAIG R. MADSEN #2045 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
IN THE MATTER OF: : 
APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZATION 
: FOR ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC 
Administrative Traffic CHECKPOINT 
Checkpoint No. 9 : 
: File No. 
APPLICATION 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-23-104, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, the undersigned, a Command Level Officer of the Utah County Sheriffs Office, State 
of Utah, hereby respectfully makes application for authorization to conduct an administrative 
traffic checkpoint based upon the following plan: 
1. Location: SR 144 in Tibbie Fork Canyon approximately one (1) mile from the 
junction with SR 92 in American Fork Canyon. 
I 
Geographical and Topographical Information: 
SR 144 is a paved two-lane road. The character of the road has a slight grade. 
On the east side of the road is a narrow shoulder wide enough for one vehicle. 
On the west side of the road is a large gravel shoulder available for several 
vehicles. 
-.000 
See attached Exhibit "A" for a site diagram and see attached Exhibit "BH for 
the ASGS Topographical Map. 
Date: 15 June 1992 through 30 September 1992. 
Time: Between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m. 
Sequence of Traffic to be Stopped: 
All traffic, as defined in Title 41-1-1(42) of the Utah Traffic Code, traveling 
east and west shall be stopped. In the event stopped traffic waiting to be 
inspected exceeds a five minute wait, all traffic shall be waived through the 
checkpoint until there are available personnel to check arriving vehicles. 
Purpose: 
a. To inspect license plates, registration certificates and insurance cards; 
b. To inspect compliance with seatbelt and child restraint requirements; 
c. To inquire if drivers have been drinking or are impaired by controlled 
substances; 
d. To visibly inspect the operation of required lights and other required 
exterior safety devices; and 
e. To inspect for other apparent criminal activity. 
Instructions given to participating deputies regarding operation and purpose are 
included in attached Exhibit WC." 
Personnel: 
A minimum of three uniformed deputies listed on Exhibit "EM attached shall 
be present at all times, one of which shall be a uniformed Patrol Sergeant, also 
listed on Exhibit "E" attached. The uniformed Patrol Sergeant is the command 
level deputy in charge of the checkpoint. The deputy in charge shall be 
responsible to maintain the roster of the deputies participating and statistical 
information concerning the checkpoint, as provided in attached Exhibit "D." 
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6. Signs, Barriers, etc.: 
Exhibit MAH attached includes a sight diagram which depicts the location, 
spacing, and the type of signs used to warn approaching vehicles of the 
checkpoint. 
Photographs in Exhibit "F" attached, depict the site with signs in place. 
7. Advance Notice: 
The notice attached as Exhibit "G" will be, or has been, published in the Legal 
Notice section of the Provo Daily Herald, running for three consecutive days. 
Notice will be run within 30 days prior to the establishment of any checkpoint. 
8. Instructions to Personnel: 
a. All participating deputies/officers shall be briefed on the content of this 
plan and be given a copy of the Utah County Sheriff Department Policies 
and Procedures of Checkpoints/Roadblocks. A copy of which is attached 
as Exhibit MG.H Each deputy shall be instructed to become familiar and 
comply with this plan and the department policies. Significant deviation 
from the plan or policy shall require specific permission from the command 
level deputy in charge. 
b. The command level deputy in charge shall be instructed that every 
permission to deviate must be documented by him as to reasons for, nature 
of, and the effect of the deviation. 
c. Personnel actually conducting the inspection and inquiry shall be instructed: 
1. To be courteous and direct motorists to the checkpoint commander if 
they wish to examine a copy of the checkpoint plan. 
2. To limit the inspection and inquiry to less than one minute per vehicle 
unless an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe 
an offense is, or has been committed. 
3. Where reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists, to move the 
vehicle out of line to a secure position where further investigation can 
be conducted without impeding the progress of other traffic through the 
checkpoint. 
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4. To direct motorists to proceed with caution and exit the checkpoint area 
when the inquiry is complete. 
9. Summary of this Plan Minimizes the Following: 
a. Length of time the motorist is delayed, the maximum delay of five minutes, 
or if all personnel are busy, then traffic is allowed to pass freely through 
the checkpoint site. 
b. Intrusion of the inspection or inquiry is minimized in that further intrusion 
beyond that described in this plan must be based upon articulable 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
c. Fear and anxiety are minimized in that advanced publication of the 
checkpoint appears in a local newspaper and advance signs are posted, 
reading "Sheriffs Checkpoint Ahead" and "Have Driver's License Ready." 
d. The degree of discretion is limited to adherence to the Sheriffs Department 
Checkpoint Policy. See attached Exhibit MG," instructions to participating 
deputies Exhibit HC,H and this cite plan. 
e. Safety is maximized through the configuration and placement of warning 
signs, barricades, flashing lights, traffic cones, auxiliary lighting, i.e., 
vehicle headlights, take down lights or spot lights. Safety of deputies is 
maximized through the use of orange reflective vests and orange flashlight 
cones. 
DATED this / ^ day of /b«^ , 1992. 
6* - k* P~ 
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AUTHORIZATION 
The undersigned has reviewed the foregoing plan and finds it to appropriately: 
L Minimize: 
a. The length of time motorists will be delayed; 
b. The intrusion of the inspection or inquiry; 
c. The fear and anxiety of the motorist; and 
d. The discretion left to the enforcement officers operating the checkpoint. 
2. Maximize the safety of motorists and enforcement officers. 
Based thereon, the undersigned hereby authorizes the foregoing Administrative 
Traffic Checkpoint. 
DATED this / * day of /U,< , 1992. 
/ClRCJ^f COURT JUDGE 
-OCK 035 
Utah County Sheriff 
DAVID R. BATEMAN, SHERIFF 
Lieutenant Craig W. Turner 
Patrol Commander 
Utah County Sherifffs Department 
P.O. Box 330 
Provo , Utah 84603 
AFFIDAVIT 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC 
CHECKPOINT AT SITE #9 
8R 144 TIBBLE FORK AREA 
Lieutenant Craig W. Turner of the Utah County Sheriff *s Department, 
herein after referred to as Affiant, being first duly sworn deposes 
and says that the following information with reference to the 
request before the Court for Administrative Traffic Checkpoints at 
Site #9, located on SR144 Tibbie Fork Area in American Fork Canyon 
in Utah County is true and correct. 
Affiant Craig W. Turner is the Patrol Commander with the Utah 
County Sherifffs Department, having served in this capacity since 
July 23, 1990. Affiant served as a Patrol Sergeant from February 
25, 1985, to July 23, 1990. Affiant has been employed by Utah 
County Sherifffs Department since July 1, 1981, and prior to this 
date, was a full-time employee with Ogden City Police Department, 
assigned to Patrol duties for 2 years and Detective duties for 5 
years. 
Affiant states that based on his experience and the experienced 
opinions of the Utah County Sherifffs Patrol Division Staff, this 
proposed checkpoint site is considered to be a problem area in Utah 
County with regards to violations of the Utah Code Annotated. 
Affiant has conducted traffic checkpoints in the past in American 
Fork Canyon locations other than Tibbie Fork and has determined 
that the Tibbie Fork area provides those features necessary in the 
canyon with regards to the safety issue and the goals of the 
checkpoint. The natural curves on either end of the proposed 
checkpoint area act as a speed inhibitor and make it difficult for 
drivers to exceed the posted speed limit of 30 mph, further 
enhancing the checkpoint supervisor's ability to control all 
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aspects of the checkpoint. T M S location also provides ample off-
road parking, and escape lanes in the event a vehicle is unable to 
stop or chooses to attempt to evade the checkpoint. 
Affiant has approved and monitored df UdoL AU Administrative 
Traffic Checkpoints sponsored by HIF Utah County Sheriff «• 
Department at this site since 1984. The majority of these 
checkpoints have been conducted similarly to the proposed 
Checkpoint Plan that is before the Court now. The warning signs and 
the placement of these signs in prior checkpoints is very similar 
to the current proposed plan. 
Affiant has directed the operations of these checkpoints at this 
site in daylight and dark, during hot and cold weather, under clear 
conditions, during rainy conditions and snowing conditions while 
utilizing similar checkpoint design and signing devices. Affiant 
has never noticed or been made aware of any problems regarding 
safety or visibility to participating law enforcement personnel or 
the general public during any of the prior checkpoints at this 
site. Affiant further states that no traffic accidents nor near 
accidents have ever happened at this site during a checkpoint or 
as a result of a checkpoint at this site. 
Affiant has titter conducted a chcukjjuinL uL 11 s during 
conditions where ice or snow has accumulated on t hi I iy nnr 
does Affiant plan to conduct any checkpoints at this site when a 
condition of this type would significantly reduce the ability of a 
vehicle to come to a controlled stop. 
Affiant further states that the checkpoint will Lc conducted 11 
strict compliance with the current Checkpoint Policy c 
County Sheriff's Department in every detail. A copy of 11 e cunenL 
policy is included with the proposal before the Court, tompliance 
with this policy includes, but is not limited to, the use of proper 
lighting during the hours of dusk and dark. The minimum lighting 
that will be used at this checkpoint site during the hours of 
darkness will include, but not be limited to the following: 
-Five flashing orange barricade lights. 
-One flood light provided by a patrol vehicle overhead system. 
-One set of flashing hazard lights mounted on a marked patrol 
vehicle which will be visible to all traffic approaching the 
site. 
-Two handheld ^iumxnated orange flashlight
 vands. 
-Reflectorized orange vests worn by all participants. 
-Reflectorization on all signs utilized as per the site plan. 
-Ten reflectorized traffic cones. 
Affiant will require the Checkpoint supervisor to create m lidn t 
created a brief video tape of each checkpoint that is conducted at 
this site. If the checkpoint is conducted during daylight hours 
and extends into dark, the supervisor will create a brief video of 
2 
the checkpoint during daylight and dark hours. This video 
documentation will be maintained on a permanent basis by the 
Affiant. 
Affiant will require the Checkpoint supervisor to furnish the 
original written briefing plan and the debriefing plan to the 
Affiant for inclusion in a permanent site record which will be 
maintained by the Affiant. 
Affiant further states that the checkpoint plan as submitted to the 
Court has been examined in detail by the Utah County Sheriff1 s 
Department Traffic Accident Specialist, who is certified as an 
accident and traffic specialist by Northwestern University and is 
currently recognized as a traffic accident reconstruction expert by 
various courts within Utah County. The specialist has informed me 
that he has examined this site in regards to all road conditions 
both natural and man made, speed limits, visibility, stopping 
distances and all other factors which may have an effect on the 
safety of this proposed plan. The specialist has informed me that 
this plan as proposed is, in his opinion, safe. The specialist has 
also assured Affiant that, in the proposed plan, he has factored in 
an acceptable margin of error in the event of excessive speed of 
vehicles entering the checkpoint warning area. 
WHEREFORE, Affiant swears and deposes that the information 
contained herein is true and correct to the best of Affiant's 
knowledge and belief. 
/y^y Ins * M**t:> /Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this AO^Say of J^X^JI 
My commission Expires: 
3 
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SPEED 
REACTION 
STOP 
DISTANCE 
INTERVAL 
30 
4 5 
45 
150 
50 
CHECKPOINT LOCATION 
SR 144 
NO FORK AM FORK CYN 
UTAH COUNTY 
<~2 
NOT TO SCALE ROBERT EYRE 1992 
TIMPANOGOS CAVE QUADRANGLE 
UTAH-UTAH CO 
7.5 MINUTE SERIES (TOPOGRAPHIC) 
NW/4 OREM IS QUADRANGLE 
111°37'30" 
40°30 
H27'30" 
02f 
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UTAH COUNTY SHERIFF 
CHECKPOINT BRIEFING INSTRUCTIONS 
INCIDENT # 
LOCATIONS 
PLANNED SEQUENCE OF TRAFFIC TO BE CHECKED: 
All traffic as defined in Title 41-1-1(42) of the Utah 
Code, traveling into the checkpoint area shall be stopped. ... 
event that stopped traffic, waiting to be inspected, exceeds a five 
minute wait, or the checkpoint supervisor determines that the 
traffic backup is becoming a possible hazard , all traffic shall be 
waived through the checkpoint until there are personnel available 
to resume checking all vehicles. 
ADDITIONAL SEQUENCE INSTRUCTIONSI 
PURPOSE OF PHFPFPOTNTr 
^
 I n S p e c t drivers i i c e n s e f i i c e n s e plates, uuluelu 
registration and insurance. 
_ „iLh stal bull .Ian . 
ghts and other exter i r HI v illicit* safety 
3 and occupants for signs of intoxication 
activity. 
conduct exterior examination of vehicles by 
to detect the odor of t inntrolled substanc 
m and inquiry is e ;:i cpected to be less t 
rat- \ >r 
NELI 
"*-ah county nil I i if I .' DepartiiiifTif 
„ iiiLiiliiiy i L l i i i j L l q ju i i i Lu , 
tine . 
INSTRUCTIONS TO I 
. J • C • v • 0 2 6 
PAGE 2 OF 2 
INSTRUCTIONS TO PERSONNEL CONTINUED: 
Note: Any significant deviation from the checkpoint plan 
or policy, shall require specific permission from 
the checkpoint supervisor. 
The supervisor shall document the reasons for, 
nature of and effect of the deviation. 
2. Personnel actually conducting the inspections and 
inquiries, shall be instructed as follows: 
A. To be courteous during contact with drivers and direct 
any inquiries regarding the checkpoint plan to the 
supervisor. 
B. To limit the inspection or inquiry to no more than one 
minute unless, an articulable, reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause, to believe an offense is being or has 
been committed, exists, which would warrant further 
inspection or inquiry and further delay of the 
motorist. 
C. Where reasonable suspicion or probable cause warrants 
continued inspection, investigation or arrest, the 
subject vehicle will be moved to a location, out of 
the traffic lanes to avoid a backup of traffic. 
D. Upon completion of the inquiry, thank the motorist for 
their cooperation and caution safety while exiting the 
checkpoint site. 
All of the above instructions on pages one and two have been 
presented to all of the participating deputies at this checkpoint. 
Date: Time: _ 
Supervisor Signature: 
2 
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CHECKPOINT EVALUATION REPORT 
INCIDENT # _ 
DATE: liT/IRT TTMI , _ _ _ _ BND 
LOCATION: HITM1 
DIRECTION OF TRAFFIC CHECKED:_ 
APPLICANT: M I N I Mill' FTPVTI'I I III 
AUTHORi: N CODRT:_ Mil I II I III II 
WEATHER 6 ROAD CONDITIONS: 
t? TI r* r* n c n 
PAGE 
CHECKPOINT EVALUATION REPORT CONT. 
PAGE 2 OF 2 
DEPUTY 
I NAME 
| TOTALS 
ALCO 
ARR 
MISD 
1
 ARR 
FEL 
ARR 
DUI 
ARR 
TRAF 
ARR 
WARR 
ARR 
VEH 
IMP 
CRS TOTALS 
DEPUTY lrsOIVroUAI REPORT 
DEPUTY: CHECKPOINT INCIDENT* 
DATE: LOCATION: 
ACTUAL TIME AT BPfiNE: START: END: 
DID Villi I M l C I i l V L LIIM l l l ' I N l i INHI I IMATTON? Y E S NO 
IIAVI! Yllll IMK'l i l Villi A H I I ' Y O F CIIIMMINT P O L I C Y ? Y E S NO 
l i l ' l l l ' I F Y ANY I'IMIIIUIMJI Oil r n N l ' T W N f i YOU IIAII IN IMIi'SAPPn 'I 'd T i l l ! ' ! 
C l l l l i ' l ' l ' i l l N T : 
INDIVIDUAL STATISTICAL INFORMATION 
CAM,: # 
| CITE # 
1 
1 TOTALS 
ALCO 
ARR 
MISD 
ARR 
DUI 
ARR 
TRAF 
ARR 
WARR 
ARR 
VEH 
IMP 
CR'S TOTALS 
JI 
NOTE: This report must be completed by each deputy participating 
in the checkpoint, regardless of whether the deputy made any 
arrests or citations. This report must be turned in to the 
checkpoint supervisor a t the end of the checkpoint* 
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E ^ i 
Adams, Gary W. 
Adamson, Shaun 
Adcock, Art 
Alexanderson, G w p 
Bateman, David R. 
Beals, Mark K. 
Beederf Charlie 
Bell, Peter 
Bennett, Dave 
Binks, Mark 
Boone, Timothy D 
Brunson, Dixie 
Cannon, Spencer 
Carlson, John 
Carter, Scott 
Castleberry, Neal 
Casto, Dick 
Christensen, lav 
Clark, Kelly 
Cloward. Glade 
Colled] 
Curtis 
( 3 
I tyne 
I Raymond 
E TV 
I 
F 
T 
1 
" - 7 
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SWORN FULL-TIME PERSONNEL 
POSITION 
Deputy III\Patrol 
Deputy IIAInv. 
Deputy III\Patrol 
Deputy IIAPatrol 
Sheriff 
Deputy IIAPatrol 
Deputy IIAPatrol 
Deputy II I\Patrol 
SgtACSEPP Coord 
Sgt.\Jail Opr. 
Corr Specialist 
SgtA Jail Opr 
Corr. Specialist 
LtACorrections 
Sgt.Mnvestgations 
Corr. Specialist 
LtAEmg Svc 
SecurityVLoss 
Deputy III\Patrol 
Deputy IIAJail 
Lt. \ Jail Opr. 
Deputy III\Patrol 
Corr. Specialist 
Corr. Specialist 
Security\Loss 
SgtAPatrol 
Deputy IIAPatrol 
Lt.Uud. Svcs. 
Deputy IIAPatrol 
Deputy IIAPatrol 
SgtAlnv. 
Deputy lAJud.Svc. 
Corr. Specialist 
Corr. Specialist 
Deputy IIAInv. 
(For Roadblock Purposes Only) 
NAME 
Hatfield, Debbie 
Healey, Richard 
Herkimer, Bonnie 
Hill, Dave 
Hodgson, Thomas R 
Horn, Jens 
Howard, Dennis 
Hunt, Alex 
Johnson, Marc 
Jones, Gregory 
Jones, Tracey 
Kenkel, Chris 
Lamph, David 
Larsen, Camille 
Martin, Charles 
Mason, Leonard 
McConnell, Mike 
Monson, Jerry 
Morgan, Michael 
Morris, Lana 
Murdock, Rex 
Murphy, JoAnn 
Orton, Pete 
Orton, Todd 
Packham, Kirby 
Patterson, Larry 
Pettro, Staci 
Phillips, Kristy 
Pickup, John 
Pientka, Mike 
Quarnberg, Owen 
Rice, Yvette 
Riding, Rob 
Robinson, Jeff 
Robinson, Rod 
Roe, Patrick 
POSITION 
Corr. Specialist 
Deputy IHAACO 
Sgt.\Jail Opr. 
Deputy JJIAPatrol 
Deputy IIINPatrol 
SgtAPatrol 
Sgt.\Jail Opr. 
SgtAPatrol 
Sgt.Uudicial 
SgtAPatrol 
Deputy IUuv Ct. 
Deputy JADist Ct. 
Captain 
Deputy I\Dist Ct. 
Corr. Specialist 
Deputy IUuv. Ct. 
Deputy IIAPatrol 
Deputy IIAPatrol 
SgtADetox 
SgtAAnimal Reg. 
Deputy IIAJud. Svc 
Corr. Specialist 
Corr. Specialist 
Corr. Specialist 
SgtAEmerg. Svcs. 
Deputy I-Dist Ct 
Uw Clerk\Bailiff 
Deputy IIAPatrol 
Sgt.Uail Opr. 
Captain 
Corr. Specialist 
Corr. Specialist 
Deputy IIAInv. 
Corr. Specialist 
Corr. Specialist 
Uw ClerkXBailiff 
U3-ZU-92 SWORN FULL-TIME PERSONNEL 
NAME POSITION 
Sam, Daniel S 
Schuring, Lisa 
Scott, Jerry 
Shiverdecker,Owen 
Shumway, Dan 
Snyder, Dave 
Swenson, Michael 
Taylor, Dan 
Taylor, Deke 
Tracy, Jim 
Turner, Craig 
Waite, Alison 
Wall, Frank 
Witney, Carla 
Law Clerk/Bailiff 
Corr. Specialist 
Captain 
Corr. Specialist 
Law Clerk\Bailiff 
Deputy IIAACO 
Corr. Specialist 
Deputy III\Inv. 
Deputy HlXPatrol 
SgtATraining 
LtAPatrol 
Uw Clerk/Bailiff 
LtAInvestigations 
Deputy HlUud. Svc 
PART-TIME EMPLOYEES 
NAME 
Bersie, Michael 
Brierly, Debbie 
Case, Richard 
Christian son, Richard 
Frye, Kelly 
Morgan, Perry 
Pulham, Scott 
Sorensen, Scott 
Stilson, Chad 
Thomas, Dan 
Wright, Eric 
POSITION 
Security/Loss 
Deputy I\Dist. Ct. 
SecurityNLoss 
Security\Loss 
Law Clerk/Bailiff 
Security/Loss 
Deputy I 
Security\Loss 
Deputy I 
SecurityNLoss 
SecurityNLoss 
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724-oo ROADBLOCKS/CHECKPOINTS 
POLICY 
724.10 
The Sheriff's Department, in an effort to conserve its 
resources and make the most economical use of its deputies 
and equipment, will establish checkpoints at various locations 
in Utah County- These checkpoints will be used, primarily, to 
enforce Title 41 of the Utah State Code as an effective method 
for protecting public safety and for creating a deterrent 
effect through increased public perception of enforcement 
activity. Roadblocks for the apprehension of specific 
criminal suspects will be consistent with provisions of the 
10-200 procedure. (10-200 Utah County Roadwatch Program is 
explained at the end of this section). 
To insure the lawful completion of law enforcement actions, 
while minimizing risk and inconvenience to the public, all 
roadblocks and checkpoints will be conducted consistent with 
the following procedures. 
PROCEDURES 
724.02 
EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES/EMERGENCY ROADBLOCKS 
724.03 
I. Such roadblocks are designed to limit or prevent vehicles 
from entering unsafe or closed roads, as may be required by 
extreme weather conditions, disasters, accidents, criminal 
investigations, etc. 
A. These roadblocks will be set up using available 
equipment. As soon as possible, arrangements will be 
made with highway maintenance departments, utility 
companies, or other entities to supply flasher 
barricades, flares signs, or other equipment and to 
assume responsibility for staffing the roadblock. 
ADMINISTRATIVE CHECKPOINTS 
724.04 
I. Checkpoints and their locations will only be established 
and operated upon written authority of a magistrate. The 
magistrate may issue written authority to establish and 
operate an administrative traffic checkpoint if: 
A. The Operation's Bureau Captain, Patrol lieutenant, or 
•00r 014 
Con't. 724.04 
their command level (rank of sgt. of above) designee 
submits to a magistrate a written plan signed by the 
command level supervisor. 
1. The plan shall include the specific location of 
the checkpoint including; geographical and 
topographical information. 
2. The configuration and location of signs, 
barriers and other means of informing approaching 
motorists that they must stop and directing them 
where to stop. 
a. Diagrams and photographs of the site 
showing road character, 
i.e. grades, curves, shoulder width and 
photographs included. 
3. Date, time and duration of the checkpoint. 
4. Sequence of traffic to be stopped. 
5. Purpose of the checkpoint including the 
inspection or inquiry to be conducted. 
6: Names of personnel to be employed operating the 
checkpoint including the name of the command level 
deputy in charge of the checkpoint 
7. The advanced notice to the public at large of 
the establishment of the checkpoint. 
a. Including the certification of publication 
in a local newspaper having general 
circulation. 
b. The advanced public notice shall be made in 
the following manner. 
1) Each month a command level deputy or 
his designee shall place one notice for 
three (3) days in a newspaper having 
general 
circulation stating: 
"DURING THE MONTH OF THE UTAH 
COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT WILL BE 
ESTABLISHING ADMINISTRATIVE CHECKPOINTS 
UNDER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT UTAH 
COUNTY IN AUTHORIZED AREAS WITH REGARD TO 
ENFORCING TITLE 41 OF THE UTAH STATE 
CODE. A LIST OF AUTHORIZED AREAS IS 
POSTED AT THE COUNTY ADMINISTRATIVE 
BUILDING. 
8. Briefing instructions shall be given to 
participating deputies prior to the establishment 
of the checkpoint. Briefing instructions shall 
be included in the checkpoint plan. 
II. A magistrate shall make an independent judicial 
determination that the plan includes the following: 
A. minimizes the length of time the motorist will be 
delayed. 
-000 01? 
Conft. 724.04 
B. Minimizes the intrusion of the inspection or inquiry• 
C. Minimizes the fear and anxiety the motorist will 
experience. 
D. minimizes the discretion to be exercised by the 
individual enforcement deputies operation the checkpoint. 
F. Maximizes the safety of the enforcement deputies and 
the motorist. 
G. Which vehicles shall be stopped and a plan to keep 
traffic moving with minimal delay, i.e. every vehicle 
or every third vehicle. 
CHECKPOINT IMPLEMENTATION 
724.05 
I. Checkpoints and their locations shall be established after 
magistrate approval and in compliance with the approved plan. 
A. Administrative checkpoints shall be staffed with a 
minimum of three (3) deputies. One of the three must be 
a command level deputy with the rank of sergeant or above 
shall be in charge of the operation of the checkpoint. 
The deputy in charge will: 
1. Have authority to make all on scene decisions 
concerning the operation of the checkpoint in the 
field, consistent with state law and Utah County 
policy and procedure. 
2. Conduct a briefing for all participating 
deputies prior to establishing of the checkpoint. 
a. Deputies shall be instructed as to the 
procedure to be followed in the approaching 
vehicles, initial contact with drivers. 
3. Debriefing shall be conducted by the checkpoint 
commander, immediately following the conclusion of 
the checkpoint. The debriefing is to provide an 
immediate critique of the operation and to receive 
constructive comment from those involved. At this 
time a summary of enforcement action taken at the 
checkpoint will be accumulated. The checkpoint 
commander shall or shall cause to be done the 
following: A summary shall include number and type 
of arrests or citations, approximate number of cars 
passing through the checkpoint. 
4. Initiate an incident report. 
5. Fill out checkpoint evaluation form UCSD OP FORM 
16 (see example)• 
6. A copy of the plan and signed authorization 
shall be issued to the checkpoint command deputy. 
7. The checkpoint command deputy shall be available 
to exhibit a copy of the plan and signed 
authorization to any motorist who has been stopped 
upon the request of the motorist. 
8. Upon the completion of the checkpoint the 
immediate area shall be policed and any debris or 
refuse generated as a result of the checkpoint 
~
3
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Con,t.724.05 
shall be cleaned up. 
B. Although the exact time and location of the checkpoint 
shall not be made public in advance, their use will be 
widely publicized to enhance the desired deterrent effect 
among potential violators. 
C The checkpoint shall be maintained at the approved 
location for a time period consistent with the activity 
experienced, but not to exceed the duration set forth in 
the checkpoint plan. 
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 
724.06 
I. Each checkpoint site shall be staffed with a sufficient 
number of uniformed deputies to maintain safe and efficient 
operation. 
II. Appropriate reflectorized safety equipment shall be 
provided and utilized by all personnel. These may include 
flares (fuses) and or reflectors to illuminate the site and 
aid in traffic direction. Warning signs, flares, cones and or 
other emergency lighting equipment shall be utilized and 
displayed in compliance with the site plan. 
III. Deputies on the checkpoint line shall use a flashlight 
with a orange traffic direction cone attached, to assist in 
the direction of traffic and aid in visibility during hours of 
darkness. 
IV. Orange reflective safety vests shall be worn by on line 
deputies during hours of darkness. 
V. Signs shall be placed at the checkpoint site prior 
establishing the checkpoint. Sign placement shall be exactly 
as diagrammed and approved in the authorized checkpoint plan. 
A. The signs shall be placed to insure that the public 
has adequate advanced warning of the checkpoint. 
1. The signs shall be illuminated by a light source 
during hours of darkness. 
a. For example the sign may state: 
"CAUTION-SHERIFFS CHECKPOINT AHEAD" 
"CAUTION-SHERIFFS ROADBLOCK AHEAD" 
2. If "NO U TURN" sign(s) is used, chase patrol 
vehicle shall be positioned near the sign. 
a. Vehicles approaching the checkpoint and 
making a prohibited WUM turn shall be pursued 
and stopped. 
b. Patrol vehicles shall be strategically 
positioned to assure safety as well as 
efficiency in pursuing non-compliant vehicles 
c. The stop on the non-compliant vehicle shall 
be handled as a traffic violator stop. 
d. The "NO U TURN" signs shall be positioned 
so as to create a safer checkpoint. This 
enables traffic to be closely controlled and 
prohibits approaching vehicles from turning 
into oncoming traffic near the checkpoint. 
-4- - «U \J w 
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e. A vehicle making a "UM turn to avoid the 
is not by itself, justification for searching 
the vehicle. It may be considered as a factor 
in establishing probable cause. 
1) All searches of such vehicles shall be 
consistent with Section 4, subsection B 
of this policy. 
2) All impounds shall be made consistent 
with provisions of the Utah County 
Sheriff1s policy and procedure manual 
section 730. 
f. Sufficient room shall be maintained at all 
times to allow a fleeing vehicle to safely 
pass through the checkpoint area. 
1) Such violations shall be pursued in 
compliance with the pursuit policy 
contained herein. 
2) persons failing to stop at an 
administrative checkpoint shall be 
arrested pursuant to state law. 
MOTORIST CONTACT 
724.07 
I. Contact between deputies and motorists shall be done in a 
professional manner. 
A. The driver of each vehicle contacted at the checkpoint 
shall be advised by the contacting deputy the purpose of 
the checkpoint and request the drivers license and 
registration. 
1. Deputies shall observe the occupants for signs 
of intoxication or other criminal activity. 
a. Deputies shall observe the stopped vehicle 
interiors for evidence of criminal activity in 
plain view. 
1) Deputies may search the vehicle only 
as authorized by law. Consent searches 
must be based on probable cause and with 
permission of the owner ( or the driver if 
the owner is not present). 
2. If all documents appear to be in order and no 
other violations of the law are suspected the 
vehicle shall be directed to proceed with caution 
through the checkpoint. 
3. Should a search, arrest or citation be necessary 
the driver shall be directed to move to an out-of 
-traffic location designated for that purpose. There 
the matter can be more fully investigated. 
a. The deputy developing the probable cause 
shall direct the remaining investigation 
process. 
1) All reports, citations and other 
O00 
Co^t. 724.07 
documents are the responsibility of this 
deputy. 
2) A sperate incident report shall be 
created for the specific incident. All 
documents generated will be referenced to 
this incident number. 
3) Any incident numbers generated as a 
result of the checkpoint shall be 
referenced to the incident number 
assigned to the command level deputy for 
the checkpoint. 
B. The sequence of traffic to be stopped( i.e. either all 
vehicles or every third vehicle) as authorized by the 
magistrate shall be followed. 
1. If the number of vehicles begin to back up to 
where the delay would be greater than five (5) 
minutes, or the backing traffic creates a safety 
hazard, the traffic shall be directed to pass 
through the checkpoint, with only obvious violators 
being detained. This will continue until the delay 
has been minimized, or the safety hazard has 
dissipated. 
-6- ..0-0 009 
PROOF OF PUBLICATION 
from 
STATE OF UTAH 
Utah County { -
I Janette Holland ^^
 flrst d u j y sworn 
depose and say that I am the Legd-1- Clerk . . . of The Daily Herald 
a newspaper of general circulation, published W times each week at Provo, 
Utah, County of Utah; that the notice attached hereto, and which is a copy 
NOTICE 
During the month of May, 
the Utah County Sheriffs 
Department will be estab-
lishing checkpoints 
throughout Utah County in 
problem areas with regard 
to enforcing Title 41 of the 
Utah State Code. • 
DAVID R. BATEMAN 
T,-SHERIFF 
No. 5187 Published In The 
Daily Herald April 13,»14, 
15. 1992. 
Thrse 
was published in said newspaper for Consecutive 
issues, the first publication having been made on the . . . . . . . day 
of . Apfi 1 19.92. . ., and the last on the .1?th
 d a y 
of . /^PrI \ 19.92.
 m . - that said notice was published in the regular 
and entire issue of every number of the paper during the period and times 
of publication, and the same was published in the newspaper proper and not 
in the supplement. 
Q^&,, 
Subscribed and sworn to before me thu '.5th day of 
.ARri.l A . D . , 1 9 92. 
Notary Public 
Residence... . 0 r e m . ' . U t a h iZ^Z" ROBERT F. JOHAKSON 
My Commission expires . .June .26 , . .1994! etoOWLYhERAlD 
004 008 
Utah County Sheriff 
DAVID R. BATEMAN, SHERIFF 
PUBLIC NOTICE 
The following locations have been selected and approved by 
Sheriff David R. Bateman for checkpoints. Checkpoints will be 
conducted at the below locations effective May 1, 1992 and 
throughout the remainder of the year. 
Site #1 SR 92 & Timpcave 
Site #2 SR 68 & Jet SR 73 
Site #3 SR 68 & Tickville Wash 
Site #4 SR 114 Geneva Road 
Site #5 Hobble Creek Canyon Road 
Site #6 Diamond Fork Canyon Road 
Site #7 SR 89 & Thistle 
Site #8 Payson Canyon Road 
Site #9 SR 144 - Tibbie Fork 
This list is subject to change with out notice 
STREET ADDRESS 51 So. University Ave., Suite 121, Provo, Utah 84601 m IONE (801) 370-880O\ ( V Q 0 7 
MAILING ADDRESS PO. Box 330, Provo, Utah 84603 FAX (801)370-8832 
1 LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL 
2 &&& H. 8. No. 259 *&& 
3 Approved for Filing LJW 
4 Date 01-29-92 1:47 PH 
5 (ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC CHECKPOINT ACT) 
6 1992 
7 GENERAL SESSION 
8 H. B. No. 259 By Ray Short 
9 
10 
11 AN ACT RELATINC TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROVIDING AUTHORIZATION FOR 
12 ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC CHECKPOINTS AND PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
13 AND OPERATION. 
14 THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
15 ENACTS: 
16 77-23-101, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
17 77-23-102, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
18 77-23-103, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
19 77-23-104, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
20 77-23-105, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
21 Be it enacted bv the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
22 Section 1. Section 77-23-101, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted 
23 to read: 
24 77-23-101. Title of part. 
25 Sections 77-23-101 through 77-23-105 mav be cited as the 
26 "Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act". 
27 Section 2. Section 77-23-102, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted 
28 to read: 
29 77-23-102. Definitions 
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1 As used in this part: 
2 (1) "Administrative traffic checkpoint" means a roadblock procedure 
3 where enforcement officers stop all, or a designated sequence of, motor 
4 vehicles traveling on highways and roads and subject those vehicles co 
5 inspection or testing and the drivers or occupants to Questioning or the 
6 production of documents* 
7 (2) "Command level officer" includes all sheriffs, heads of law 
8 enforcement agencies, and all supervisory enforcement officers of 
9 sergeant rank or higher* 
10 (3) "Emergency circumstances" means circumstances where enforcement 
11 officers reasonably believe road conditions, weather conditions, or 
12 persons present a significant hazard to persons or the property of other 
13 persons, 
14 (4) "Enforcement officer" includes: 
15 (a) peace officers as defined in Chapter la. Title 77; 
16 (b) correctional officers as defined in Chapter la. Title 77; 
17 (c) special function officers as defined and under the restrictions 
18 of Chapter la. Title 77; and 
19 (d) federal peace officers as defined in Chapter la. Title 77; 
20 (5) "Magistrate" includes all judicial officers enumerated in 
21 Subsection 77-1-3(4). 
22 (6) "Motor vehicle" includes all vehicles &$ defined in Chapter 1« 
23 Title 41, 
24 Section 3. Section 77-23-103. Utah Code Annotated 1953. is enacted 
25 to read: 
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* 77-23-103* Circumstances permitting an administrative traffic 
2 checkpoint. 
3 A motor vehicle may be stopped and the occupants detained bv an 
4 enforcement officer when the enforcement officer! 
5 (1) is acting pursuant to a duly authorized search warrant or arrest 
6 warrant; 
7 (2) has probable cause to arrest or search; 
8 (3) has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or 
9 is occurring; 
10 (4) is acting under emergency circumstances; or 
11 (5) is acting pursuant to a duly authorized administrative traffic 
12 checkpoint authority granted by a magistrate in accordance with Section 
13 77-23-104. 
14 Section 4. Section 77-23-104, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted 
15 to read: 
16 77-23-104, Magistrate authority required. 
17 (1) An administrative traffic checkpoint may be established and 
18 operated upon written authority of a magistrate. 
19 (2) A magistrate may issue written authority to establish and 
20 operate an administrative traffic checkpoint if: 
21 (a) a command level officer submits to the magistrate a written plan 
22 signed bv the command level officer describing: 
23 Ci) the location of the checkpoint including geographical and 
24 topographical information; 
25 (ii) the date, time, and duration cf the checkpoint; 
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1 (iii) the secuer.ee of traffic to be stopped; 
2 (iv) the purpose of the checkpoint including the inspection or 
3 inquiry to be conducted; 
* (v) the names of the personnel to be employed in operating the 
5 checkpoint including the name of the officer or officers in charge at the 
6 scene; 
7 (vi) the configuration and location of signs, barriers, and other 
8 means of informing approaching motorists that thev must stop and 
9 directing them to the place to stop; 
10 (vii) er»v advance notice to the public at large of the establishment 
H of the checkpoint; and 
12 (viii) the instructions to be given to the enforcement officers 
13 operating the checkpoint; and 
14 (b) the magistrate makes an independent judicial determination that 
15 the plan appropriately; 
16 (i) minimizes the length of time the motorist will be delayed; 
17 (ii) minimizes the intrusion of the inspection or inouirv; 
18 (iii) minimizes the fear and ar.xietv the motorist will experience; 
19 (iv) minimizes the deeree of discretion to be exercised bv the 
20 individual enforcement officers operating the checkpoint; and 
21 (v) maximizes the safety of the motorist and the enforcement 
22 officers. 
23 (3) Upon determination bv the magistrate that the plan meets the 
24 reouirements of Subsection (2Mb), the magistrate shall sign the 
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1 authorization and issue it to the command level officer, retaining a copy 
2 for the court's file. 
3 (4) A copy of the plan and signed authorization shall be issued to 
* the checkpoint command level officer participating in the operation of 
5 the checkpoint. 
6 (5) Any enforcement officer participating in the operation of the 
7 checkpoint shall conform his activities as nearly as practicable to the 
8 procedures outlined in the plan. 
9 (6) The checkpoint command level officer shall be available to 
*0 exhibit a copy of the plan and signed authorization to any motorist who 
11 has been stopped at the checkpoint upon request of the motorist. 
12 Section 5. Section 77-23-105, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted 
13 to read: 
14 77-23-105. Failure to stop — Criminal liability. 
15 Any person who intentionally and knowingly passes, without stopping 
16 as required, anv administrative traffic checkpoint operated under the 
17 authority of a magistrate as provided in Section 77-23-104 is guilty of a 
18 class B misdemeanor. 
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MANAGEMENT AND FISCAL ANALYSIS 
H. B. 259 
The additional workload to the courts for magistrates review, 
issuance of warrants and appeals is estimated to be approximately 
$18,800 in General Funds per year, starting in FY 1993. Increases 
in civil and criminal action revenue, resulting from administrative 
traffic check points, cannot be estimated at this time. 
OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE FISCAL ANALYST 
ADDENDUM E 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
************************* 
IN THE MATTER OF: FINDINGS 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC 
CHECKPOINT NO. 9 CASE NO. 
(SR 144 Tibbie Fork Canyon) 
************************** 
On June 15# 1992, the Utah County Attorney's office, together 
with Lt. Craig W. Turner of the Utah County Sheriff's office, 
submitted a written application and authorization for an 
administrative traffic checkpoint. The only issue before the court 
is whether the authorization which is sought is allowed by virtue 
of compliance with House Bill 259. The constitutionality of 
administrative checkpoints under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution or Article I, Section 14 of Utah's Constitution 
is not at issue. The application is supported with over 20 pages 
of exhibits, 8 relevant photographs, and a copy of House Bill No. 
259, the Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act. Supplemental 
information regarding the safety of the motorists and the 
enforcement officers was required by Judge Lynn W. Davis. Lt. 
Craig W. Turner, Patrol Commander of the Utah County Sheriff's 
submitted a supporting affidavit dated June 12, 1992. This court 
has carefully reviewed the application and the exhibits to 
determine compliance with the Act. Of major concern of this court, 
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is the protection of citizenry; the health, safety and welfare of 
the travelling and pedestrian and law enforcement public are vital. 
This court makes the following: 
FINDINGS 
1. House Bill 259 (Administrative traffic Checkpoint Act) was 
passed in the 1992 session of the Utah State Legislature. 
2. House Bill 259 went into effect on Monday, April 27, 1992. 
3. The application seeks authority to stop vehicles under 77-
23-103(5) which purports to allow vehicle stops and occupant 
detention when the enforcement officer Mis acting pursuant to a 
duly authorized administrative traffic checkpoint authority granted 
by a magistrate in accordance with § 77-23-104." 
4. For the purposes herein, Judge Lynn W. Davis, a Fourth 
Circuit Court Judge, is acting as a magistrate. 
5. Officer Craig Turner, Deputy Utah County Sheriff, is a 
command level officer and has submitted a written plan in 
conformity with 77-23-104(2)(a)(i). 
6. The location of the checkpoint, geographically and 
topographically, is adequately described in paragraph 1 of the 
application. An ASGS topographical map is attached to the 
application as Exhibit "B" and the photographs in Exhibit "F" 
further visually describe the area. The application fully complies 
with the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(i). 
7. The date, time and duration of the checkpoints are 
adequately described in paragraph No. 2 of the application and the 
applicant has complied fully with the requirements of 77-23-
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104(2)(a)(ii). There is nothing in the Act which would appear to 
preclude the seeking of a multiple-day authority as requested by 
the applicant herein. Faithful compliance with the plan would, of 
course, be necessary on all authorized days. 
8. The sequence of the traffic to be stopped is adequately 
and reasonably identified in paragraph No. 3 in the application and 
the applicant has fully complied with the requirements of 77-23-
104(2)(a)(iii). 
9. The purpose of the checkpoint and the inspection or 
inquiry to be conducted are adequately and reasonably identified in 
paragraph No. 4, a, b, c, d, and e of the application. 
Furthermore, the court finds that Exhibit ,fCff attached to the 
application supplements the purposes and the inquiry set forth in 
the application. The court specifically finds that the applicant 
has complied with the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(iv). 
10. The request of the applicant is for a continuing, large 
scale checkpoint for 75 days. By virtue of that uniqueness, the 
applicant has provided a pool of names of officers who will 
participate in the checkpoints. The pool is comprised of the names 
of officers who actually will participate, but the exact assignment 
has not yet been determined. Paragraph No. 5 of the application 
provides that a minimum of three uniformed deputies will be present 
at each checkpoint, with one being a uniformed patrol sergeant. 
The patrol sergeant shall be the command level deputy in charge of 
the checkpoint. The court further finds that the patrol sergeant 
shall maintain a roster of participating deputies. 
3 
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While 77-23-104(2)(a)(v) appears to require exactitude in the 
naming of personnel, it certainly does not appear that a pool of 
names as provided herein would be necessarily precluded. 
This court finds that the information contained within 
paragraph No. 5 of the application, together with the information 
contained in Exhibit "E" sufficiently complies with the 
requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(v). (This court, as an aside, has 
also made this finding of compliance based upon the best interests 
of justice, judicial economy, 1 court case as opposed to 75 cases 
opened reducing clerk staff time etc., and based upon the realities 
of law enforcement and daily life; law enforcement officers may be 
called at any time, even while conducting a checkpoint, to 
emergencies and/or a specifically identified officer may become 
sick, etc. Would a substitution of an equally trained, qualified 
and competent officer defeat the checkpoint, absent magisterial 
sanction for the substitution? The critical concern of this court 
is that trained, uniformed officers, conduct the checkpoint 
according to the magisterial authorized plan and that a patrol 
sergeant be present who is in charge. The pooled concept appears 
both to meet the intent of the law and the health, safety and 
welfare concerns of this court in protecting the travelling and 
pedestrian and law enforcement citizenry of this community.) 
11. Exhibit "A" attached to the application and the 
photographs in Exhibit MFM depict the types and location/site, and 
spacing of signage which will be used. The application satisfies 
the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(vi). 
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12. A reference is made to advance notice in paragraph 7 of 
the application. Legal notice, though very generic, has been or 
will be published in the Legal Notice section of the Provo Daily 
Heraldr running for three consecutive days. Notice is or has been 
run within 30 days prior to the establishment of the requested 
checkpoint. The application is supported by Exhibit MGMf which 
contains a copy of the Legal Notice published on Wednesday, April 
15, 1992 in Section D page 3 of the Provo Daily Herald. Proof of 
publication has also been presented. The court takes judicial 
notice that the Provo Daily Herald is a newspaper of wide and 
general circulation in Utah County. Accordingly, this court finds 
the application meets the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(vii). 
13. Exhibit "C" attached to the application details the 
instructions that will be read by each Officer involved in the 
operation of the checkpoint and satisfies the requirement of 77-23-
104(2)(a)(viii). 
14. The court finds that the plan minimizes the length of 
time the motorist will be delayed (77-23-104(2)(b)(i)) because of 
the following: 
a) Routine inspection and inquiry is expected to be 
less than one minute in duration; (see Utah 
County Sheriff Checkpoint Briefing Instruction, 
paragraph 6, attached as Exhibit ,fCM). 
b) In the event stopped traffic waiting to be 
inspected exceeds a 5 minute wait, all traffic 
shall be waived through checkpoint until there 
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are available personnel to check arriving 
vehicles. (Application, paragraph 3). 
c) Safety precautions have been faithfully 
addressed. 
15. The Court further finds that the intrusion upon the 
travelling public is minimal and that the plan anticipates that 
routine inspection and inquiry is expected to take less than one 
minute in duration. (Utah County Sheriff Checkpoint Briefing 
Instructions). 77-23-104(2)(b)(ii). Deviation from the plan is 
not permitted except as authorized under specific circumstances. 
16. The court finds under 77-23-104(2)(b)(iii), that the plan 
takes measures to attempt to minimize the fear and anxiety the 
motorist will experience by virtue of: 
a) signage; 
b) notice; 
c) the location of the checkpoint is a straight-of-way; 
d) safety issues have been faithfully addressed; 
e) pull off areas for the travelling public are provided; 
17. The court further finds that the degree of discretion to 
be exercised by individual enforcement officers operating the 
checkpoint is minimized (77-23-104(2)(b)(iv)) by virtue of the 
following: 
a) the exact location is established; 
b) the signage is established by the plan; 
c) the length of time the motorist will be delayed is 
established by the plan; 
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d) sequence of traffic issues are addressed by the plan; 
e) inquiry is limited under the plan; 
f) any necessary further inspections will be conducted out of 
traffic lanes; 
g) most importantly, any deviation from the checkpoint plan 
or policy shall require specific permission from the 
checkpoint supervisor who shall document the reasons for, 
nature of and effect of any deviation (Utah County Sheriff 
Checkpoint Briefing Instructions, page 2, 2(d)). 
18. The application satisfies the requirements of 77-23-
104(2)(a)(v). The utilization of signage, notice, flashing lights 
take into account safety measures to protect the travelling and 
pedestrian traffic. The location chosen has pull off areas and is 
a straight-of-way. This finding is based upon the plan of the 
exhibits submitted and the affidavit of Officer Craig Turner. 
Specifically, the court relies upon the affidavit which supports 
the facts that the court finds that: 
a) the choice of location is based upon safety 
considerations; 
b) SR 144, approx 1 mi. from the junction with SR92 in 
American Fork Canyon provides the best conditions 
available with regards to safety issues and the goals and 
purposes of the checkpoint; 
c) Lt. Turner has participated in or supervised at least 20 
checkpoints at this location since 1984; 
d) it is a location where the patrol sergeant (supervisor) 
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can control all aspects of the checkpoint; 
e) the location provides escape lanes in the event a vehicle 
is unable to stop or chooses to attempt to evade the 
checkpoint; 
f) the warning signage and placement is similar to that 
utilized in the past and safety problems to the travelling 
public and the participating officers have not been 
problematical; 
g) no traffic accidents nor near accidents have ever happened 
at this site during a checkpoint or as a result of a 
checkpoint at this site; 
h) adequate lighting will be utilized to alert the travelling 
public when conducted at night; 
i) the plan has been submitted to, and examined in detail by# 
the Utah County Sheriff's Department Traffic Accident 
Specialist, who is certified as an accident and traffic 
specialist by Northwestern University and who is currently 
recognized as a traffic accident reconstruction expert by 
courts in Utah County; 
j) said specialist has examined the plan with respect to all 
road conditions, both natural and man made, speed limits, 
visibility, stopping distances and all other factors which 
may have an effect on the safety of the proposed plan; 
k) in addition, the specialist has factored in an acceptable 
margin of error in the event of excessive speed of 
vehicles entering the checkpoint warning area; 
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k) after thorough examination and review, the Department's 
Traffic Accident Specialist has opined that the plan# as 
submitted, is safe. 
18. By virtue of the above findings, this court specifically 
finds that the plan meets the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(b) as 
required by 77-23-104(3) and the balance of the requirements of the 
Act and that authorization to conduct the checkpoint in accordance 
with the plan may issue. 
DATED this /jT day of June, 1992. 
LYNN W. DAVIS 
Fourth Circuit Court Judge 
Acting as Magistrate 
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ADDENDUM F 
KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
CRAIG R. MADSEN #2045 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
IN THE MATTER OF: : 
ORDER AUTHORIZING 
: ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC 
Administrative Traffic CHECKPOINT 
Checkpoint No. 9 : 
File No. £ £ £ / - //73 A1S 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Lynn Davis presiding, on the State's 
Application for Administrative Checkpoint filed on or about June 15, 1992. The Court, having 
considered the application and made and entered its findings of fact and being fully advised in 
the premises, does hereby issue the following authorization to Craig Turner, a command level 
officer in the Utah County Sheriffs Office, to operate an administrative traffic checkpoint to be 
supervised by any of the following command level sergeants of the Utah County Sheriffs Office: 
Kerry Evans, Jens Horn, Alex Hunt, Mike McConnell or Jim Tracy. 
1. Location: SR 144 in Tibbie Fork Canyon approximately one (1) mile from the 
junction with SR 92 in American Fork Canyon. 
Geographical and Topographical Information: 
SR 144 is a paved two-lane road. The character of the road has a slight grade. 
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On the east side of the road is a narrow shoulder wide enough for one vehicle. 
On the west side of the road is a large gravel shoulder available for several 
vehicles. 
See attached Exhibit HAM for a site diagram and see attached Exhibit "BM for the 
ASGS Topographical Map. (All Exhibits in this order refer to exhibits attached 
to the application and are hereby incorporated by reference and shall also be 
attached to this order.) 
2. Date: 15 June 1992 through 30 September 1992. 
Time: Between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m. 
3. Sequence of Traffic to be Stopped: 
All traffic, as defined in Title 41-1-1(42) of the Utah Traffic Code, traveling 
east and west shall be stopped. In the event stopped traffic waiting to be 
inspected exceeds a five minute wait, all traffic shall be waived through the 
checkpoint until there are available personnel to check arriving vehicles. 
4. Purpose: 
a. To inspect license plates, registration certificates and insurance cards; 
b. To inspect compliance with seatbelt and child restraint requirements; 
c. To inquire if drivers have been drinking or are impaired by controlled 
substances; 
d. To visibly inspect the operation of required lights and other required 
exterior safety devices; and 
e. To inspect for other apparent criminal activity. 
Instructions given to participating deputies regarding operation and purpose are 
included in attached Exhibit "C." 
5. Personnel: 
A minimum of three uniformed deputies listed on Exhibit "E" attached shall 
be present at all times, one of which shall be a uniformed Patrol Sergeant, also 
listed on Exhibit ME" attached. The uniformed Patrol Sergeant is the command 
level deputy in charge of the checkpoint. The deputy in charge shall be 
responsible to maintain the roster of the deputies participating and statistical 
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information concerning the checkpoint, as provided in attached Exhibit "D." 
Participating deputies may be any of the Sheriffs officers identified in Exhibit 
"EM provided that any officer participating is fully briefed and operates in 
accordance with this order. 
6. Signs, Barriers, etc.: 
Exhibit HAM attached includes a sight diagram which depicts the location, 
spacing, and the type of signs used to warn approaching vehicles of the 
checkpoint. 
Photographs in Exhibit "F" attached, depict the site with signs in place. 
7. Advance Notice: 
The notice attached as Exhibit "G" will be, or has been, published in the Legal 
Notice section of the Provo Daily Herald, running for three consecutive days. 
Notice will run within 30 days prior to the establishment of any checkpoint. 
8. Instructions to Personnel: 
a. All participating deputies/officers shall be briefed on the content of this 
plan and be given a copy of the Utah County Sheriff Department Policies 
and Procedures of Checkpoints/Roadblocks. A copy of which is attached 
as Exhibit HG." Each deputy shall be instructed to become familiar and 
comply with this plan and the department policies. Significant deviation 
from the plan or policy shall require specific permission from the command 
level deputy in charge. 
b. The command level deputy in charge shall be instructed that every 
permission to deviate must be documented by him as to reasons for, nature 
of, and the effect of the deviation. 
c. Personnel actually conducting the inspection and inquiry shall be instructed: 
1. To be courteous and direct motorists to the checkpoint commander if 
they wish to examine a copy of the checkpoint plan. 
2. To limit the inspection and inquiry to less than one minute per vehicle 
unless an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe 
an offense is, or has been committed. 
3. Where reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists, to move the 
vehicle out of line to a secure position where further investigation can 
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be conducted without impeding the progress of other traffic through the 
checkpoint. 
4. To direct motorists to proceed with caution and exit the checkpoint area 
when the inquiry is complete. 
9. A copy of this order shall be retained in the Court's file. The original shall be 
issued to Lt. Craig Turner, the command officer who executed the application for 
this order. 
10. A copy of the roadblock plan and this signed authorization together with all 
attachments shall be issued to the patrol sergeant participating and in command of 
the operation of the checkpoint. 
11. All enforcement officers participating in the operation of the checkpoint shall 
conform their activities as nearly as practicable to the procedures outlined in the 
plan. 
12. The checkpoint command level officer (patrol sergeant in charge) shall be available 
to exhibit a copy of the plan and signed authorization to any motorist who has been 
stopped at the checkpoint upon request of the motorist. 
Based thereon, the undersigned hereby authorizes the foregoing Administrative Traffic 
Checkpoint. 
DATED this / 5~ day of • T / ^ ^ * " " 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
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ADDENDUM G 
H.B. 259, Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act 
49th Legislature, Regular Session 
Day 39,2/20/92 
Tape 1 at 2957-3994 
Sponsor: Rep. Ray Short. 
Rep. Short: This is a critical bill to the State. This is a must need bill. Let me give you 
background on what happened. Police officers throughout the State thought 
they had permission to set up roadblocks when and if they wanted and they 
found out last March that they couldn't. The court of appeals here 
overturned a case, and they held that according to the constitution, this 
legislative body, is the one that must give permission or direction to set up 
traffic checkpoints anywhere within this State. So, this bill is in response to 
that. That according to the constitution, this bill is going to set up 
permission, guidelines, and directions to set up traffic checkpoints 
throughout the State by police officers. It really is a safety issue. It really has a 
lot to do with alcohol and drunk driving. We don't need them on the road. There 
is also another impact to this bill. If you look at the fiscal (inaudible), they've got 
about $18,000 in it. But there's a federal program to give money to the State to 
help with drunk driving problems and alcohol problems in the State. There are six 
requirements that have to be met under the federal guidelines to get this federal 
money to help us with drunk driving on the roads. We already meet four of them. 
Senate Bill 101, which is coming, is the next requirement and this is the final 
requirement that the State qualifies to receive plus or minus three-quarters of a 
million dollars to help with the drug problems and the alcohol problems in the 
State. That's basically the context of it. It can be set up to stop beer parties up in 
the canyons, on graduation night. It's just a safety issue, so I urge your support of 
this bill. 
Rep. Tanner: I am just a little bit curious on one point. Less than a half hour ago, the sponsor of 
the bill stood upon the House floor and said he appreciate being in this country 
because of the freedom of choice and so on and I think also that he was opposed 
to doing anything about smoking or doing anything about helmets or seatbelts 
because that was not an issue of safety and yet the bill that you are sponsoring 
now is one that takes complete freedom of choice of drivers away and you are 
saying that it is now a matter of safety. I'm just curious. I'd like to ask how this 
is a matter of safety versus helmets or seatbelts or other things that were voted on 
and why this is not a choice issue in your mind as much as the other issues that 
you brought up today. 
Rep. Short: This is more of a legal issue than choice because it is needed in the State to help 
the police officers do their job. 
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Rep. Tanner: You also said it was a safety issue. 
It definitely is a safety issue and driving is a privilege. You have to get a license 
to drive. It's kind-of funny, I was up the canyons about a summer or two ago 
about graduation time. And I was in my little Alfa Romeo, I didn't look the least 
bit like anybody who was drinking and I didn't mind being stopped. We got a lot 
of problems. And I think all of us have been out, if you haven't been out with the 
highway patrol, it's an education. And I was out with them one night until late in 
the morning and I was amazed at what was on the road at that time. I just feel it's 
a tremendous safety issue; it's a lot different than smoking. You can smoke all 
you want but you're not going to run me over. You can drink all you want and 
you might run me over. So, there's definitely a difference between smoking in a 
room where you can inhale it yourself and driving a vehicle down the road drunk 
and kill me. Smoking will not kill me directly, but driving a car under the 
influence will kill me directly. I think that's the difference, Representative. 
In one item, it's a choice, and for those of us who supported the seatbelt issue 
here, it was something that was a matter of safety; it had nothing really to do with 
a matter of choice. I completely agree with what you are trying to do in this bill, 
but I'm just trying to point out that now you say it's a matter of safety and not a 
matter of choice. And, I just would like to comment on that. 
Rep. Valentine:I rank in support of this bill and let me tell you why. There have been three 
cases in the courts of appeals and supreme courts that lam familiar with and' 
there may actually be more, where the court has tried to define how you 
establish an administrative roadblock. The problem is that if you just go out 
will-nilly saying ok, we are going to have a roadblock this weekend up Provo 
Canyon, and we are going to stop every second vehicle, every third vehicle, 
there's no way to attest to the due process that is administered to that 
administrative roadblock* What this bill attempts to do is to codify, and say 
these are the criteria that you're gonna use, these are the standards that you 
are gonna conduct the roadblock by and these are the types of things you're 
going to try to look for. It's a problem of balancing between the free flow of the 
traffic through the canyon or through the other place you are doing it or conduct a 
checkpoint, and the need to protect us from drivers who are under the influence of 
alcohol. What this bill does is it attempts to address those cases and to define 
how it can be done without having to be challenged each and every time there 
is a citation issue or a DUI taken to the jail. So this bill really is need for that 
purpose. Yeah there's safety issues, yeah there's issue that we talked about 
already, but there's really the issue of trying to narrow it down so we have, in 
effect, a cookbook that we can follow in our public safety department and say 
that if you follow the cookbook, this citation's gonna stand. If you don't 
follow the cookbook, then you have a challenge. So, I speak in favor of the bill. 
Rep. Short: 
Rep. Tanner: 
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Rep. Voight: Representative, I'm in full support of this bill, but where are you gonna get the 
police officers to do be able to do this? I've been out riding with the police 
officers and when they've got two and three on for the whole evening, where are 
you gonna get the police officers to set up these checkpoints? We are so low on 
officers right now on the highway. They want to put in photocops because they 
don't have the officers that patrol for speeding. Where are we gonna get the 
police officers to set up these checkpoints is my question. 
Rep. Short: The police officers are there, and this is a much more efficient system. 
Rep. Voight: I agree with you. 
Rep. Short: It's something that they plan. It won't be willy nilly. They have to go to a 
magistrate before they set it up so they've got the time, the energy, and the 
manpower to do it. 
Rep. Voight: I've questioned them on speed traps on the highways. They've said they can't do 
it because they just don't have enough officers. If they set up a checkpoint, 
there's probably going to be 8 to 10 officers that have to be out there at one time. 
They don't have that many in a whole district at one time anymore, until you put 
more police officers on. Would this help to put more police officers on? 
Rep. Short: They don't do it all the time. It's just at a set time, place, necessity, need, you 
know, as we were out with the highway patrol, we had six in our little section too. 
They've got the manpower to do it, but they don't just do it willy nilly, that's 
what this bill is gonna do; it's gonna make it planned and programed, magistrate-
assisted, and it will help. 
Rep. Voight: Thank you. I'm in support of your bill. 
Rep. Short: Thank you. 
Rep Price: Representative Short, what will this do to the trucking industry? You know they 
get so many pounds of gross weight on them, get rolling and they have to stop for 
normal inspections and road inspections and so forth. What will this do to the 
trucking industry and in slowing them down? 
Rep. Short: I don't know what it will do in slowing them down. I doubt very much that this is 
going to be set up to stop the truckers. We're more interested in the alcohol and 
the driving under the influence. 
Rep. Price: Have you talked to the trucking industry and how do they feel about it. 
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Rep. Short: I have no input and it's been out for a while. 
Rep. Price: You've haven't had any input? 
Rep. Short: I've had no input from the truckers. 
Rep. Uipi: I wish to make an amendment Mr. speaker. 
Speaker: Proceed, Representative. 
Rep. Uipi: Page 5, line 7, after the word "activities," take out "as nearly as practicable" and ? 
then insert "strictly" to the procedures outlined in the plan. 
Speaker: Strictly to the procedures what? 
Rep. Uipi: Strictly to the, well, the word that is inserted is just "strictly." 
Speaker: So we're just inserting the word strictly. So it would read "confirm his activities 
strictly to the procedures outlined in the plan," is that correct Representative? 
Rep. Uipi: Excuse me, my cohort here was talking to me while I was ah trying to present my 
point here. 
Speaker: So there word we're deleting is "as nearly as practicable" and we're inserting the 
word "strictly," is that correct? 
Rep. Uipi: That's correct. 
Speaker: Ok. Proceed Representative. 
Rep. Uipi: I think its only fair especially when you know we are driving down the street and 
we're stopped, I think the police officers, sheriffs need to adhere strictly to the 
plan. I don't think we need to give them leeway because we may be heading 
down the canyon and heading to Provo or on our way or anywhere we may be 
heading and we'll be stopped and basically for 15,20, 30,40 minutes, however 
long, and I think they need to adhere strictly to what has been outlined in the plan, 
in the checkpoint plan. Otherwise, they can drag on this thing for too long. So I 
would urge your support of this motion. I think it would just help the patron of 
the street as well as the officer so that he can just don't do whatever he wants to 
do. Or he may, on his own discretion. So I hope you will support this motion. 
Rep. Short: I do not mind taking out "as nearly as practicable" but I would just, "strictly" is an 
extremely difficult word to deal with. I'd just as soon have "in accordance with 
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the plan." "Strictly" opens up a whole can of worms too, I think. So I would 
kinda, I'd take half of the amendment but . . . would object to the strictly part. 
Rep. Harward: Boy I speak strongly against this amendment. When you're talking about a plan 
that talks about minimizing the length of time, and minimizing intrusion, and 
minimizing fear, how do you put a concrete, explicit, specific on there? And if 
you then turn around and say you have to strictly comply, boy you've got a 
standard that's just about impossible. You basically throw this bill away to say 
the slightest technical deviation, we complain at lot about technicalities that get 
people off, well you just created about every group of technicalities you ever saw 
in this bill to put strict compliance in it. As nearly as practical, gives the judge the 
opportunity to look at the circumstances and see if the intent of the officer, and the 
efforts of the officer, and the substantial portion of what they were doing was to 
comply. But it doesn't hang up on one ticky, technical violation of a strict word. 
It was four minutes and fifteen seconds instead of four minutes that the intrusion 
was, I would strongly urge that we not give all these technicalities to the person 
who is trying to defend a drunk driving charge because it went five seconds over. 
Rep. Uipi: I think, if we go back to the freedom issue, you need to understand that one drunk 
driver may be stopped, but there may be 50 or 60 of us behind the drunk driver. 
And, it's important the we need to take him out of the street, but nonetheless, we 
need to protect our right of those who do not drink and drive and in a hurry to go 
to their own destination. I think it's a good amendment and I think that we need 
to, that you need to support it Thank you. 
Speaker: Motion to amend is found on page 5, line 7 to delete "as nearly as practical" and 
insert "strictly." Those in favor say "aye." Opposed. Motion to amend fails. 
Rep. Short: In other words, it's just a stop; a willy nilly approach but they have to get a 
magistrate to say it's ok. 
Rep. Jorgensen: And there is a pressing need for this? What is that? 
Rep. Short: Ok. The pressing need is the court of appeals has stated that it's the 
legislature that must get this legislation passed so that the police officers have 
permission to do this. That's one. Right now the courts have ruled they 
cannot do it at all. So this is in response that we perform our duty under the 
constitution and that we as a legislative body must have this legislation to 
allow traffic checkpoints. That's one. The other thing is it will create a fund 
from the federal government to help us to combat drunken driving on the roads 
and the drugs that are going freely across. 
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Rep. Jorgensen: Is this what this is aimed at then? The problems that they are having in 
Southern Utah? Is this the primary aim or the sole aim or . . . 
Rep. Short: The primary aim is the courts have ruled they can't do it without us telling 
them to. And this is the method to give them permission to do it. 
Rep. Jorgensen: They cannot, can't do what? 
Rep. Short: They cannot have... Traffic checkpoints right now, it's against the law. 
Rep. Jorgensen: Well, I guess I'm not being clear. The first four conditions under, on the top of 
page three, are already in existence. What you're adding is condition number 
five, is that, that's what I understood. Did I miss that? 
Rep. Short: That's correct. It's a procedural thing. 
Rep. Jorgensen: Ok. Then, what you're saying is that the FBI kind-of stereotype kind-of thing 
that says you can stop, that these people are drug people, or X or Y, or Z, that's 
not allowed under a checkpoint, it that what you're addressing? 
Rep. Short: I'm not sure what you're saying. We can't have a checkpoint without this bill. 
Period. We can have emergency checkpoints. But we gotta have this 
permission to set up a controlled, approved by a magistrate, checkpoint. 
Rep. Jorgensen: Condition number then three doesn't cover that? Under reasonable cause, that 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity has occurred or is occurring? 
Rep. Short: No. This has been challenged in court and the bill is needed to give the 
courts jurisdiction. 
Rep. Jorgensen: Alright. Thank you. 
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